



**Yuki Kimura's** exhibition of new work is titled *Inhuman Transformation of New Year's Decoration, Obsolete Conception or 2.*

**Yuki Kimura translates abstract ideas into tangible objects. Her conceptual approach involves borrowing elements from architecture, design, photography, and sculpture in service of making the immaterial material. She often includes found photographs, but their subject matter, composition, and context are subordinate to their presence as physical objects.**





Kimura is intuitively drawn to photographs that she finds in pairs. This type of detail may conjure personal memories, like the way drugstores and one-hour photo shops in the 1980s and 1990s would print doubles, but it also relates to the artist's engagement with theoretical ideas. Here identical twin images reference a traditional Japanese New Year's decoration, *kagami mochi*, that symbolizes the idea of a mirror, as well as a western philosophical concept of time in which past and present are intertwined.

*Division and Revision #2 (2016)*

These two (almost identical) photographs depict colored liquor and wine bottles placed on a three-tiered stand. Most likely taken decades ago, these enlarged reprints divide the space in half.

We are too accustomed to thinking in terms of the “present.” We believe that a present is only past when it is replaced by another present. Nevertheless, let us stop and reflect for a moment: How would a new present come about if the old present did not pass at the same time that it is present? How would any present whatsoever pass, if it were not past *at the same time* as present? The past would never be constituted if it *had not been* constituted first of all, at the same time that it was present. There is here, as it were, a fundamental position of time and also the most profound paradox of memory: The past is “contemporaneous” with the present that it *has been*. If the past had to wait in order to be no longer, if it was not immediately and now that it had passed, “past in general,” it could never become what it is, it would never be *that* past. If it were not constituted immediately, neither could it be reconstituted on the basis of an ulterior present. The past would never be constituted if it did not coexist with the present whose past it is.<sup>15</sup> The past and the present do not denote two successive moments, but two elements which coexist: One is the present, which does not cease to pass, and the other is the past, which does not cease to be but through which all presents pass. It is in this sense that there is a pure past, a kind of “past in general”: The past does not follow the present, but on the contrary, is presupposed by it as the pure condition without which it would not pass. In other words, each present goes back to itself as past. The only equivalent thesis is Plato’s notion of Reminiscence. The reminiscence also affirms a pure being of the past, a being in itself of the past, an ontological Memory that is capable of serving as the foundation for the unfolding of time. Yet again, a Platonic inspiration makes itself profoundly felt in Bergson.<sup>16</sup>

15. Cf. ME, 157-160 (913-914, 130-131): “I hold that the *formation of recollection is never posterior to the formation of perception; it is contemporaneous with it* . . . For suppose recollection is not created at the same moment as perception: At what moment will it begin to exist? . . . The more we reflect, the more impossible it is to imagine any way in which the recollection can arise if it is not created step by step with the perception itself. . . .”

*Mirrors* (2016)

A pair of identical mirrors forms an alter ego for the photographs. Placed side-by-side, they repeat the reality of the photographs ad infinitum, just like mirrors placed face-to-face.

object. They are therefore already visible in the image of the object: Even when not realized (but simply possible), they are actually perceived, or at least perceptible in principle. "This actual, not merely virtual, apprehension of subdivisions in the undivided is precisely what we call objectivity." Bergson means that the objective is that which has no virtuality – whether realized or not, whether possible or real, everything is actual in the objective. The first chapter of *Matter and Memory* develops this theme more clearly: Matter has neither virtuality nor hidden power, and that is why we can assimilate it to "the image." No doubt there can be *more* in matter than in the image we have of it, but there cannot be anything else in it, of a different kind.<sup>6</sup> And in another passage Bergson praises Berkeley for having assimilated body and idea, precisely because matter "has no interior, no underneath, ... hides nothing, contains nothing, ... possesses neither power nor virtuality of any kind... is spread out as mere surface and... is no more than what it presents to us at any given moment."<sup>7</sup>

In short, "object" and "objective" denote not only what is divided, but what, in dividing, does not change in kind. It is thus what divides by differences in degree.<sup>8</sup> The object is characterized by the perfect equivalence of the divided and the divisions, of number and unit. In this sense, the object will be called a "numerical multiplicity." For number, and primarily the arithmetical unit itself, is the model of that which divides without changing in kind. This is the same as saying that number has only differences in degree, or that its differences, whether realized or not, are always actual in it. "The units by means of which arithmetic forms numbers are *provisional* units which can be subdivided without limit, and ... each of them is the sum of fractional quantities, as small and as numerous

6. MM, 71-72 (218-219, 75-76).

*Table Stella* (2016)

These three pairs of tables are produced in three distinct sizes with reflective steel legs. Each tabletop is made of an enlarged version of a pair of appropriated photographs. Ashtrays made from natural material are scattered across the tabletops like a constellation, partially obscuring the image.

But we must, in another oscillation, be delighted that the Whole is not given. This is the constant theme of Bergsonism from the outset: The confusion of space and time, the assimilation of time into space, make us think that the whole is given, even if only in principle, even if only in the eyes of God. And this is the mistake that is common to mechanism and to finalism. The former assumes that everything is calculable in terms of a state; the latter, that everything is determinable in terms of a program. In any event, time is only there now as a screen that hides the eternal from us, or that shows us successively what a God or a superhuman intelligence would see in a single glance.<sup>19</sup> Now this illusion is inevitable as soon as we spatialize time. Indeed, in space it is sufficient to have a dimension supplementary to those where a phenomenon happens for the movement in the course of happening to appear to us as a ready-made form. If we consider time as a fourth dimension of space, this fourth dimension will thus be assumed to contain all the possible forms of the universe as a whole; and movement in space, as well as flowing in time, will now only be appearances linked to the three dimensions.<sup>20</sup> But the fact that real space has only three dimensions, that Time is not a dimension of space, really means this: There is an efficacy, a positivity of time, that is identical to a “hesitation” of things and, in this way, to creation in the world.<sup>21</sup>

It is clear that there is a Whole of duration. But this whole is virtual. It is actualized according to divergent lines; but these lines do not form a whole on their own account, and do not resemble what they actualize. If the choice is between mechanism and finalism, finalism is preferable; provided that it is correct in two ways. On the one hand, it is right to compare the living being to the whole of the universe, but it is wrong to

20. Cf. DS, 137 (203ff.) on the example of the “curved plane” and of the “three dimensional curve.”

21. DS, 63 (84): There is “a certain hesitation or indetermination inherent in a certain part of things” that becomes merged with “creative evolution.”

*Table Matematica* (2016)

A black granite table is crowded with bottles of Jägermeister in 13 distinct sizes. The bottles are recognizable by their branding, and the only apparent difference between them is their size. Although Jägermeister evokes a unique flavor, it is not accessible here.

object. They are therefore already visible in the image of the object: Even when not realized (but simply possible), they are actually perceived, or at least perceptible in principle. "This actual, not merely virtual, apprehension of subdivisions in the undivided is precisely what we call objectivity." Bergson means that the objective is that which has no virtuality – whether realized or not, whether possible or real, everything is actual in the objective. The first chapter of *Matter and Memory* develops this theme more clearly: Matter has neither virtuality nor hidden power, and that is why we can assimilate it to "the image." No doubt there can be more in matter than in the image we have of it, but there cannot be anything else in it, of a different kind.<sup>6</sup> And in another passage Bergson praises Berkeley for having assimilated body and idea, precisely because matter "has no interior, no underneath, ... hides nothing, contains nothing, ... possesses neither power nor virtuality of any kind ... is spread out as mere surface and ... is no more than what it presents to us at any given moment."<sup>7</sup>

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8. Cf. MM, 206 (341, 231). "As long as we are dealing with space, we may carry the division as long as we please; we change in no way the nature of what is divided."

chological duration should be only a clearly determined case, an opening onto an ontological duration. Ontology should, of necessity, be possible. For duration was defined from the start as a multiplicity. Will this multiplicity not – thanks to movement – become confused with being itself? And, since it is endowed with very special properties, in what sense can it be said that there are *several* durations; in what sense can there be said to be a *single one*; in what sense can one get beyond the ontological alternative of *one/several*? A related problem now becomes more urgent. If things endure, or if there is duration in things, the question of space will need to be reassessed on new foundations. For space will no longer simply be a form of exteriority, a sort of screen that denatures duration, an impurity that comes to disturb the pure, a relative that is opposed to the absolute: Space itself will need to be based in things, in relations between things and between durations, to belong itself to the absolute, to have its own “purity.” This was to be the double progression of the Bergsonian philosophy.

The title of the exhibition, *Inhuman Transformation of New Year's Decoration, Obsolete Conception or 2*, is replete with references. Kimura's work rarely depicts people, and when it does, they are often obscured by plants or other impediments. The use of the word *inhuman* suggests a philosophical concern beyond the human condition and also refers to the camera, which is often described as inhuman, the perfect confluence of technology and thought. Following that trajectory, *obsolete conception* may be a nod to philosophical ideas that seem antiquated but that have laid the foundation for more contemporary theories.

Opening in late 2016 and ending in early 2017, the entire exhibition acts as a New Year's decoration.

— Jeanne Gerrity

Yuki Kimura (b. 1971, Kyoto, Japan) lives and works in Berlin. Kimura graduated from Kyoto City University of Arts in 1996. She has had solo exhibitions at venues including Taka Ishii Gallery, Tokyo (2015), Mathew Gallery, Berlin (2015), Gluck50, Milan (2014), the Izu Photo Museum, Japan (2010), and Daiwa Press Viewing Room, Japan (2009). She has also participated in numerous group exhibitions worldwide, including *Ocean of Images: New Photography*, Museum of Modern Art, New York (2015); *Better Homes*, SculptureCenter, New York (2013); the *30th São Paulo Biennial* (2012); and *The 4th Daegu Photo Biennale*, Daegu (2012).

*Yuki Kimura: Inhuman Transformation of New Year's Decoration, Obsolete Conception or 2* is on view at CCA Wattis Institute for Contemporary Arts, San Francisco, from December 13, 2016, through February 25, 2017, and is co-curated by Jeanne Gerrity and Leila Grothe.

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Ashtray images from eBay listings selected by Yuki Kimura.

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