June 8 - August 17, 2024

# James T. Hong Apologies and Other Regrets

Empty Gallery 18/19 F. Grand Marine Center 3 Yue Fung Street Hong Kong Empty Gallery is pleased to present *Apologies and Other Regrets*, James T. Hong's second solo exhibition with the gallery. Since the late 1990s, Hong has produced searing moving image works which deploy elements of experimental, documentary, and essayistic filmmaking to critically address issues of class, race, and historical trauma in America and East Asia. His research-based practice often operates along the fraught intersection of epistemological and socio-political questions, interrogating the manner in which knowledge is produced, disseminated, and manipulated in the service of power.

In our 19th floor gallery, Hong presents the newest iteration of his film Apologies (2012-ongoing) in a monumental three-channel version. Shown most recently at the Jewish Museum in Vienna, Apologies is a taxonomic investigation into that most contemporary phenomenon: the political apology. Hong's film functions simultaneously as documentation of the technics of mediatized diplomacy, and a sort of historical index of past atrocities via their—often facile—national acknowledgements. Painstakingly assembling broadcast footage of various heads of state—from Willy Brandt's historic visit to the Warsaw Ghetto to contemporary regrets over the seizure of indigenous land— Apologies sometimes resembles a perverse compilation of "greatest hits", albeit one filtered through Hong's uniquely grim sense of humor and the rhythmic seriality of the structural film. Apologies may at first seem impenetrable, or perhaps even arbitrary, a procedural exercise whose aura of gray facticity and strained propriety contains few aesthetic charms. But after a while, the polished surfaces of these diplomatic performances start to exert their own sort of hypnotic pull. Within the overdetermined space of the public apology, attention is drawn towards the supposedly inessential. The viewer watches for inevitable fissures between script and performance, moments of either semiotic scarcity or excess, analyzing the politician's body like a text, on the hunt for insincerity or double-meanings communicated through the length of a pause or tilt of the head. Experiencing these performances in series, one is occasionally struck by a strange sense of pathos. However terrible the leader or great the crime, we are still confronted with the insufficiency of a single human body to ever contain the symbolic weight of history and nation—perhaps pointing to the essential futility of even apologizing for these events at all. *Apologies*, then, proffers itself as evidence of the failure of modern politics to address historical trauma and break free from cyclical violence—the supposed moral progress of history reduced to a formalist repetition of apologetic styles.

On our lower floor, Hong will also present a series of new sculptures entitled *Stabbed In The Back*. Referencing the famous English fable of the sword in the stone, these sculptures take the form of trompe-loeil rocks—resembling what one might find on a film set or amusement park—embedded with WWII-era Japanese bayonets. Juxtaposing the light-hearted kitsch of the fantasy prop with the brutal facticity of the murder weapon, these works point to the complex dialectic between historical truth and national mythology. Embodying the (literal) weaponization of trauma, they bear witness to the ever-present possibility for real historical violence to reanimate itself and erupt into the present.

Empty Gallery很高興為大家帶來洪子健在畫廊的第二個個展《Apologies and Other Regrets》。自二十世紀90年代末以來,洪子建創作了許多尖銳的流動影像作品,這些作品採用實驗性的、紀錄片的和散文式的電影元素,批判性地探討了美國和東亞的階級、種族和歷史創傷問題。他以研究為基礎的實踐經常在認識論和社會政治問題的充滿爭議的交叉點上展開,拷問知識是如何被生產、傳播和操縱以服務於權力的。

在畫廊的19樓空間中,洪子健以紀念碑式的三屏影像呈現他的作品〈Apologies〉 (2012年至今)的最新版本。最近在維也納猶太博物館展出過的〈Apologies〉是對政 治道歉這一當代現象的分類學調查。他的這部影像既是媒介化外交技術的記錄 . 同 時也經由國家對過去暴行的——通常是膚淺的——承認,成為一種歷史的索 引。從 威利·布蘭特 (Willy Brandt) 歷史性訪問華沙猶太區到各種對掠奪原住民土 地的現代 致歉,〈Apologies〉悉心匯編了各國元首的電視節目片段,有時看起來像一部怪 異的「最佳合集」,透過洪子健獨特和憂鬱的幽默感以及結構電影的節奏性 和連續 性而過濾形成。〈Apologies〉一開始可能令人費解,甚至顯得很隨意,像是一種 程序性的練習,其灰色的事實和惡化的正當性所帶來的氣氛中幾乎沒有美學 魅力。 但過了一段時間後,這些外交表演的光鮮外表開始產生一種獨特的催眠吸引力。在 公開道歉的多重決定空間內,注意力被引向那些所謂的無關緊要之處。觀眾 開始觀 察腳本和表演之間不可避免的裂縫,關注那些符號意義的不足或過剩的時 刻,將政 治家的身體當作文本來分析,尋找過長的停頓或頭部的傾斜所揭示的虛偽 或雙重意 義。連續觀看這些表演,人們偶爾會被一種奇特的悲愴感所打動。無論領 導人多麼 糟糕或罪行多麽嚴重,我們面對的仍然是一個人個體的身軀永遠不足以 承載歷史和 國家的象徵重量——這也許正說明,為這些事件道歉本身是根本徒勞 的。因此

〈Apologies〉提供了現代政治無法處理歷史創傷和擺脫循環暴力的證據 ——所謂歷 史道德的進步只能淪為道歉風格的形式主義重複。

在畫廊的下層空間,洪子健還將展出一系列名為〈Stabbed In The Back〉的新雕塑作品。這些雕塑參考了英國著名的「石中劍」寓言故事,以視覺陷阱般的石頭造型出現——類似於電影道具或遊樂園中中的假石山——上面嵌有二戰時期的日本刺刀。將幻想道具的輕鬆詼諧和殺戮武器的殘酷事實相並置,這些作品指向歷史真相與國家神話之間複雜的辯證關係。它們體現了創傷(在字面意義上)的武器化,見證了真實的歷史暴力重新自我復活並爆發於當下的永恆可能性。

## James T. Hong at Empty Gallery

#### Apologies and Other Regrets

#### I. ABSOLUTE SOVEREIGNTY

The English term 'sovereign' derives from the Latin roots *super* ('above') and *regnum* ('kingdom'). It refers to a supreme ruler (often a monarch), and extends to the related concept of sovereignty—the authority to govern oneself and others absolutely. This is where things start to become tricky, because no matter how hard you look, there is no way to guarantee this power over oneself and others—a major bummer for rulers, who must constantly refresh and reinforce the terms of any claim to power.

In most modern states, political legitimacy is neatly folded into a machine for organising competing interests through the transparency of law, the accumulation of capital, or the use of military force. But something about this machine is always leaky, always venting air, always vulnerable. The concept of sovereignty itself seems to suggest something deeper and more fundamental than any machine at all: something intractably organic, cosmic or absolute. This inherent deficit leaves modern states and modern subjects always yearning for the mythical closure of an absolute claim, for the unity and totality that the circular, transactional logic of administrative power can never provide.

From this perspective, sovereignty can only ever be experienced as a painful split—a necessity to decide one's own fate, but also a failure to secure any significant guarantees for doing so against constant challenges. And the remedies are always colourful and clever—absolute right can spring out of anything from God's lightning bolts, family bloodlines, to supernatural claims to superpowers and contact with aliens. To be truly proud and truly whole by reclaiming what has been revoked since our mythical origin, another desperate solution is to simply vanquish our enemies—who are often our weakest and most defenceless neighbours.

#### II. HARM

It can be hard to understand how a government can order a full-scale genocide, whether in a neighbouring country, an occupied territory, or within its own dominion. It can be hard to understand how such violence can receive the full support of a nation's people. It can be hard to understand while it is happening to you, and it can be hard to

understand while you are fully supporting it. Just as it can be hard to understand how it happened in the past, repeatedly, and often under the auspices of modern territorial, industrial, or political progress.

On the other hand, there are times when, at the highest levels of power, a government must publicly recognize that harm has been done, whether out of genuine remorse or fear of reprisal, by issuing an official apology. And yet, time cannot move backwards to undo what has already taken place. No one can bring back the dead from a massacre or a genocide. But if that is the case, why bother apologising at all?

#### III. APOLOGIES

James T. Hong's video installation *Apologies* (2012-ongoing) is a compilation of modern political apologies. In Hong's own words, *Apologies* is "a timeline of modern political progress as unrepentant recidivism and contrite repetition". As a work-in-progress now approaching seven hours in length, it continues to grow, absorbing further documentation of political regrets each year, according to the rule that any apology be issued directly from the seat of power—not, for example, by a retired member of state or as an expression of personal sentiment. They must be formal, official declarations of the highest order. Which does not mean that all are successful, or even convincingly apologetic. On the contrary.

Still, within the exceptional interval of the political apology, a technically sincere expression of feeling eclipses the practice of power and the modern nation state can become a strange foreign object. In the case of *Apologies*, this strangeness extends to a broader civic apparatus where gestures of goodwill shrivel in the face of irrevocable error and the irreversibility of time. The fiction of sovereignty pertains not only to state power, but also to what we can expect from one another.

Watching repentant heads of state leads one to wonder how such a gesture could be received by those for whom it should be most meaningful. Has the adequate dosage of sincerity been administered in the performance? If not, what does it expose about the intentions behind the original harm? Will the apology even fulfil any political purpose at all?

#### IV. BLOWBACK

In the unstable interval of the apology, there are also significant risks. Feelings and sensitivities can run wild with rogue interpretations. A shortfall of remorse may reveal a latent intention to repeat the regrettable act. The supposed progress of letting bygones be bygones may cause everything to snap back to the very beginning of the trauma, reopening wounds that had to some extent healed with the passing of time.

The perpetrators, still thinking themselves gods, may believe their acknowledgement and supplication to have great value. In fact, their apology creates an abysmal mirror that refracts and further extends the offence, now destined to play on loop for eternity. No matter how necessary or sincere, the apology's futile symbolism can always backfire—especially when addressing immense pain that future generations will inherit.

And yet, the nature and extent of the harm holds great power over what the apology can achieve. Symbolic harm, like a clumsy insult, can usually be erased by the symbolic balm of an apology. Sorry! I take it back! I didn't mean it! But what if the harm caused irrevocable damage? What if the same government that ordered an ethnic cleansing, a full-scale extermination filled with spite and malice, absent of all feeling or compassion, must apologise? It can only do so by fabricating such an overabundance of feeling and compassion that it might neutralise the effects of its damage—and still without restoring anything that was lost.

A more profound and painful process of self-examination comes when, in full shame, a perpetrator contends with their own power to kill and maim, measuring their own identification with their deeds. If some self-denigration or submission to the unfathomable, some product of humiliation, can be extracted from the act of performing an impossible task, this just might work. But such a wrenching self-examination, however sincere, never really happens, because being a perpetrator is only a matter of perspective. Nations often play the role only temporarily, and for rhetorical reasons. A number of entries in *Apologies* follow military defeats, making the acknowledgements necessary pragmatic moves for removing paralysing constraints on continued sovereignty. The acknowledgements of atrocities committed by victors of the same conflicts, on the other hand, are consistently absent from the work, because those acknowledgements never took place. Victory justifies atrocity retroactively, and who really apologises for winning?

A well-delivered apology might soothe pain that would otherwise have grown to monstrous proportions, causing damage to the state and to the highest levels of power. A well-delivered apology understands that revenge can taste delightful, and that retaliatory violence can easily surpass any original transgression, especially when delivered under the cover of unacknowledged pain. Especially when it seeks a pyromaniac reckoning, a total undressing of all historical power.

#### V. EXCALIBUR

James T. Hong's *Stabbed in the Back* (2023-ongoing) is a series of sculptures featuring an authentic Japanese bayonet used in the Second Sino-Japanese War (instigated by the Empire of Japan on the Republic of China from 1937–45) embedded in a mock stone made of plastic and styrofoam. At first the scene might appear funny, because many are familiar with the legend of Excalibur, the sword in the stone that young Arthur, unaware

of his birthright and lineage, extracted to reveal himself as the "one true king" of Britain. This is the special alchemy of sovereignty par excellence: a blood anointment tinctured with the innocent heart of good moral character, a totem of power as a riddle in matter. It is the supernatural predestination that haunts sovereign power, a yearning for a legitimacy so real that it can only exist as fiction.

Instead of harbouring Excalibur's magical legitimacy, Hong's stone is penetrated by an actual weapon of Imperial Japan, whose influence by European imperialism and fascism is well known. Returning the Japanese bayonet to the Arthurian legend of British sovereignty popularised by Disney's 1963 animated film creates an uncanny familiarity, even if by criss-crossing divergent cultural and political histories.

The bayonets used in these sculptures were bought from collectors of Sino-Japanese War memorabilia or elderly former soldiers of Imperial Japan. Indeed, the Empire of Japan's bloodthirsty conquest of China left millions dead, as Japanese prime minister Tomiichi Murayama first acknowledged in a famous 1995 statement included in Hong's *Apologies*. These blades, in stark contrast with the set-designed rocks which hold them, may well have shed blood or taken Chinese lives in their time—making them prime material for a later wave of ascendant nationalism drawing from shared trauma and victimhood. Sheathing them now in a British magical legitimacy made of plastic and foam might seem cheeky. And yet, a time may come when the material reality of the blade converges with the consequences of impossible sovereignty, because the sword in the stone can only await the arrival of a rightful heir who can claim its power once again.

#### VI. ENEMY INSIDE

Real national repentance is unfathomable when some part of the perpetrator also understands himself to be the victim, or as having been forced by circumstances outside of his good nature into monstrous deeds. Furthermore, severe humiliation initiates yet another catastrophic sequence. A perpetrator may appear pragmatic and apologetic, but may also commit the same atrocity again, and apologise again for that. A perpetrator may sleep, like a sword in a stone, rebranding its cities as hubs for creatives and young entrepreneurs, all the while awaiting the right moment to strike once more. The quest for sovereignty is ultimately self-consuming, whether in its cyclical smoothness or its contorted, fumbling desperation. There are many techniques of occupation and many popular formulas for legitimising dominion over others, but how far can they go when absolute control over oneself—whether as a political body or organism—can never be total? In the end, the perpetrator can only misrecognise himself, turning inward against his own body like a cancer.

-Brian Kuan Wood

## I. 絕對的主權

英文中的「sovereign」源自拉丁語的詞根「super」(之上)和「regnum」(王國)。它指的是至高無上的統治者(通常是君主),並延伸到相關的主權概念——絕對治理自己和他人的威權。這也是事情變得棘手的地方,因為無論你如何努力,都無法確保對自己和他人權力的絕對性——這對於統治者來說十分令人掃興,為此他們必須不斷地刷新和強化權力主張的先決條件。

在大多數現代國家,政治合法性被巧妙地折疊於一台機器中,通過法律的透明度、資本的積累或軍事力量的使用來組織利益的競爭。但這台機器的某些部分總是有漏洞,總是在漏氣,總是脆弱的。主權的概念本身似乎暗示著某種比任何機器都更深刻、更根本的東西:有機的、宇宙的、絕對的,難以駕馭的東西。內在的缺陷使得現代國家和現代主體總是渴求一種絕對主張所帶來的神話般的閉合,總是渴望統一性和整體性,雖然行政權力中循環論證的交易性邏輯永遠無法提供它們。

從這個角度看,主權是一種分裂的痛苦體驗——它是命運自決的必要因素,但面對挑戰又不斷地失敗,無法提供任何重要的保障。補救措施總是狡黠多樣的——從上帝的閃電、家族的血統,到超自然的超能力甚至與外星人的接觸,任何事情都可以製造絕對的權力。為了能夠真正自豪和完整地重申我們神話起源以來被取消的東西,另一種孤注一擲的方法很簡單,就是乾脆消滅我們的敵人——他們往往是我們最弱小、最無助的鄰居。

## II. 傷害

可能很難理解一個政府如何能下令進行全面的種族滅絕,無論是在鄰國、被佔領的領土或是在自己的版圖內。可能也很難理解這樣的暴力能被一個國家的人民全力支持。當發生在你身上時,你可能很難理解它;當你全力支持時,你也可能很難理解它。就像我們可能很難理解它是如何在過去反覆發生的,而且往往是在現代領土、工業或政治進步的名義之下。

另一方面,某些時候,在權力的最高層面,不論是出於真誠的懊悔或對報 復的恐懼,政府必須公開承認造成的傷害,必須發布正式道歉。但是,時間無法倒 流,已然發生的已無法撤銷。沒人能讓大屠殺或種族滅絕中的亡者復生。如果事已 至此,為什麼還需要道歉呢?

## ш. 道歉

洪子健的影像裝置作品〈Apologies〉(2012至今)是一部現代政治道歉的匯編。用洪子健自己的話說,〈Apologies〉是「現代政治進程的一條時間線,充滿不悔的累犯和懺悔的重複」。作為一部正在進行中的作品,它已長達近七小時,也還在繼續增加中,每年吸收更多的政治悔過書,依照規則只能是來自權位之上者的任何直接道歉——比如說,不能是已退位者的個人情感表達。道歉必須是最高級別的正式官方申明。這並不意味著所有的道歉都是成功的,或是令人信服地充滿真正的歉意。事實往往恰恰相反。

儘管如此,在政治道歉的例外間隙內,情感表達的技術性真誠可掩蓋權力的實踐,使得現代民族國家成為一個陌生的異物。以〈Apologies〉為例,這種奇異性延伸到更廣泛的公民機制,其中善意的姿態在不可挽回的錯誤和不可逆轉的時間面前變得萎縮。主權的謊言不止涉及國家權力,也涉及我們對彼此的期望。

看著悔過自新的國家元首們,人們不禁要問,這種姿態對那些最需要它們的 人來說會有何反應。道歉的表現是否已注入恰當的真誠?如果沒有,它揭示了何種 關於最初傷害中的意圖和真相?這種道歉能達成任何政治目的嗎?

## ɪv. 反彈

在道歉的不穩定間隙中,也存在著重大的風險。敏感的情緒可能會因異常的解讀而變得不可控。悔意不足則可能揭示再次犯錯的潛在意圖。讓逝去的就逝去吧,所謂的進步可能會導致一切回到創傷之初,隨著時間推移已在某種程度上癒合的傷口會再度撕裂。施暴者,仍自視為神明,可能認為他們的承認和祈求具有重大的價值。事實上,他們的道歉創造了一面深淵之鏡,折射並進一步擴大了罪行,並注定將永恆循環地播放下去。無論道歉多麼必要或真誠,其徒勞的象徵意義總是可能適得其反——尤其是面對那種在代際間繼承的巨大痛苦時。

然而,傷害的性質和程度對道歉的效果有很大的影響。象徵性的傷害,例如笨拙的侮辱,通常能通過道歉中象徵性的安撫來消除。對不起!我收回!我不是故意的!但如果已造成不可逆轉的損害呢?如果下令進行種族清洗,進行充滿怨恨和惡意的、毫無感情和同情心的全面滅絕的同一個政府,它必須道歉呢?它只能通過編造過剩的感情和同情,試圖中和其傷害帶來的影響,但仍然無法挽回任何已失去的東西。

只有當施暴者在完全的羞愧中反思自己的殺戮和殘害能力,衡量其所作所為的自我認同,一種更深刻和痛苦的自我審視過程才會開始。從這不可能完成的任務的行動中,如果能提取一些自我否定、對無法理解之物的臣服,或一些因屈辱而產生的東西,這行動或許還是有效的。但無論如何真誠,這種極為痛苦的自我審視並未真正發生過,因為成為施暴者只是一個視角問題。國家往往只暫時扮演這一角色,而且只出於修辭上的原因。〈Apologies〉作品中的許多記錄都是隨著軍事失敗而發生的——此時,承認成為必要的務實之舉,以消除對繼續行使主權的癱瘓性限制。另一方面,同一衝突中的勝利者對自己暴行的承認總是持續缺席的,它們從未發生過。勝利在事後為暴行辯護,誰會真的為勝利而道歉呢?

一次表達得當的道歉可以撫平傷痛,否則這種傷痛可能會發展到駭人聽聞的程度,對國家和最高權力機構造成傷害。與之相反的,我們理解復仇的快感,報復性的暴力可以輕易超越任何最初的過錯,特別是當它發生在不被承認的痛苦之中,特別是當它尋求一種燒毀一切的瘋狂清算,一種對所有歷史性暴力的徹底反抗時。

## v. 石中劍

洪子健的〈Stabbed in the Back〉(2023至今)是一系列雕塑作品,由刺刀插在泡沫塑膠製成的假石中所組成,這些真的日本刺刀曾使用於中日戰爭裡(1937年至1945年間由日本帝國對中華民國發動的戰爭)。這一幕初看起來顯得滑稽,因為很多人都熟悉「石中劍」的傳說,即年輕的亞瑟在不知道自己血統和身世的情況下拔出了石中劍,以顯示自己是英國的「真命天子」。這是至高無上的主權的特殊煉金術:一種參雜著善良品德和純真之心的受洗的血膏,一種作為物質之謎的權力圖騰。超自然的宿命縈繞於主權之上,對主權正當性的渴望是如此真實,以至於它只能存在於虛構中。

洪子健的石頭沒有承載「石中劍」的神奇合法性,它們被日本帝國的真實武器所穿透,而日本帝國受歐洲帝國主義和法西斯主義的影響是眾所週知的。將日本刀刺放回由迪斯尼1963年動畫電影所普及的關於英國主權的亞瑟王傳說中,不同的文化和政治歷史在此縱橫交錯,產生一種怪異的熟悉感。

這些雕塑中使用的刺刀是從中日戰爭紀念品收藏家或日本帝國的老兵那裡購買的。的確,日本帝國對中國的嗜血征服使得數百萬人死亡,正如日本前首相村山富市在1995年發表的一份著名聲明中首次承認的,該聲明也收錄在洪子健的作品〈Apologies〉中。這些刺刀,與放置它們的佈景假石形成鮮明的對比,可能真的曾

讓中國人留血或喪生——後來民族主義浪潮在共同的創傷和受害者情結中不斷高漲,這些刺刀正是促進它的重要材料。現在,把這些刺刀置於泡沫塑料製成的英國神話合法性中是顯得過於戲謔了。然而,會有那麼一天,當刺刀的物質現實與急難應對的主權的惡果相交匯時,石中的刺刀可能將被再次拔起,因為它們只是等待著所謂合法繼承人的到來,等待他們再次宣稱自己的權力。

## vi. 內部的敵人

當施暴者的某些部分認為自己也是受害者,或相信自己是被其善良本性之外的環境所迫而做出了駭人的罪行,那麼真正的國家懺悔是不可想像的。此外,嚴重的羞辱會引發另一連串災難性的後果。施暴者可以看起來是務實和充滿歉意的,但也可能再次犯下同樣的暴行,並為此再次道歉。施暴者可能像石中劍一樣暫時沈睡,將自己的城邦重新塑造為創意者和年輕創業者的家園,同時等待著再次發動攻擊的時機。對主權的追求最終是自我消耗的,不論是在其週期性的平穩中,還是在扭曲、笨拙摸索著的絕望中。為了合法化自己對他人的統治,有許多佔領的技巧和許多流行的公式可以採用,但當對自身的絕對控制——無論是政治體或是有機體的——永遠無法實現時,這種技巧和公式能走多遠呢?最終,施暴者只能錯誤地認知自己,像癌症一樣向內對抗著自己的身體。

-Brian Kuan Wood

James T. Hong is a Taiwanese-American artist and filmmaker whose research-based practice interrogates the metaphysics of truth, navigating the intersection of epistemological, ethical, and socio-political questions. While best known for his experimental and essayistic films, his practice has recently expanded into sculpture. Hong critically traces the racialized power mechanisms that underpin processes of knowledge production and dissemination, and how they perpetuate historical trauma and contemporary injustice in America and East Asia.

Hong was awarded the Best World Documentary Award at the Jihlava International Festival (2007); Art Matters Foundation Grant, NYC (2018), and Best Documentary - Mecenat Award from the Busan International Film Festival (2018). His work has been the subject of solo exhibitions at the Jewish Museum of Vienna (2022); Ikon Gallery (2021) and Empty Gallery (2024, 2019). Recent group exhibitions include Bonner Kunstverein (2024); the Haus der Kulturen der Welt (2022, 2017); Center Pompidou Metz (2021); 12th Taipei Biennial (2020); the Museum of Contemporary Art, Belgrade, Serbia (2018).

洪子健是一位台灣裔美國藝術家和製作人,以其具有哲學性的研究型藝術實踐 著稱。二十年來,他的作品探索著真理的奧秘,並著眼於認知論、倫理及社會政治 問題的交匯點上展開深入研究。洪子健的創作實踐領域涵蓋實驗性和散文性影像, 近年來也拓展至雕塑領域。他批判性地追溯知識生產和傳播過程的權力機制,以深 究這些機制如何在美國和東亞造成歷史創傷與現代社會不公義的深化。

洪子健曾獲多項殊榮,包括2007年捷克伊赫拉瓦國際紀錄片影展的最佳世界紀錄片獎、2018年紐約Art Matters基金會獎及2018年釜山國際電影節最佳紀錄片獎。他曾在多個著名機構舉辦個展,包括維也納猶太博物館(2022)、伯明翰Ikon畫廊(2021)以及Empty Gallery (2024、2019)。近期參與的群展包括邦納藝術協會(2024)、世界文化宮(2022、2017)、龐畢度中心梅斯分館(2021)、第十二屆台北雙年展(2020)及貝爾格勒當代藝術博物館(2018)。