The subject that no one in the art world wants to talk about is usually politics. Yet, because every social or cultural relationship is a political one, we regard an understanding of the link between politics and culture as essential. "Politics" cannot be restricted to those arenas stipulated as such by professional politicians. Indeed, it is fundamental to our methodology to question every aspect of our cultural situation from a political point of view, to ask, "What politics inform accepted understandings of art and culture? Whose interests are served by such cultural conventions? How is culture made, and for whom is it made?"

From Group Material (Julie Ault, Doug Ashford, Felix Gonzalez-Torres), "On Democracy." In *Democracy | A Project by Group Material*. Ed. Group Material and Brian Wallis. Discussions in Contemporary Culture, no. 5, p. 1. Seattle: Bay Press; New York: Dia Art Foundation, 1990.

How Austrian Liberals Silenced Pro-Palestinians

BY

ROSE-ANNE GUSH / DANNY HAYWARD

If German public debate is infamous for its pro-Israel dogmas, the situation is as bad in Austria. While the far-right Freedom Party is now normalized, pro-Palestinians are silenced in the name of "anti-fascist" solidarity with Israel.

Over the past twelve months, much has been written about the ways in which German "memory culture" around the Holocaust has been used to silence artists and cultural producers who speak out about the genocide in Gaza. But what about Austria to the south — a German-speaking country also characterized by concentrated wealth, high taxation, generous funding for the arts, and historical responsibility for antisemitic crimes?

Here, a situation that is in certain ways worse has been much less widely publicized. Austria was the only European country apart from the Czech Republic to vote against both cease-fire resolutions in the United Nations General Assembly in the last months of 2023. Its second most prominent politician, the president of its National Assembly, was still asserting in April 2024 that Austria "stand[s] unconditionally at the side of Israel." Things have not changed visibly under his successor, Walter Rosenkranz of the far-right Freedom Party of Austria (FPÖ), who took office after this latter's election victory last September. While less spectacularly brutal than in Germany, censorship of pro-Palestinian speech in the Austrian cultural sphere has been no less systematic, and the treatment of dissenting Jews no less shameful.

Given the relative absence of an "Austrian memory culture" akin to the much-trumpeted German variant, this may seem paradoxical. But as a country in which the main post-Nazi political party, the FPÖ, was always integrated into the system of "consociational," or cartelized, parliamentary democracy, Austria's inability to confront its history of antisemitism is inseparable from another failure: its inability to marginalize the main party of the far right. Seeing as this party has solidified its position in national electoral politics mainly by rhetorically and practically attacking migrants and refugees from majority-Muslim countries, this failure to deal with the past leads to support for Israel just as surely as does a selective engagement with the past in Germany.

"Antisemitism of the Left"

More than in any other rich European state, the Austrian political landscape is increasingly defined by preemptive or what has been called "subjunctive" adoption of far-right policy and dogma. This can be seen most clearly in the attacks on "left-wing antisemitism" by Austrian People's Party (ÖVP) minister for the EU and constitution Karoline Edtstadler, who speaks picturesquely about an antisemitic "pendulum," which has swung with mechanical inevitability from political right to left.

Her partiality for this theory — contradicted even by statistics that count support for the Boycott, Divestment, and Sanctions movement as antisemitic by default — is accompanied by practical efforts to outflank to the Right even the historically Nazi and antisemitic FPÖ, specifically on anti-terror surveillance measures directed mainly against Muslims. Theories and allegations of left-wing antisemitism are equally prevalent among left-liberals, who have also done much to circulate more everyday forms of Islamophobia, reinforcing a far-right anti-immigrant agenda that is today expressed most prominently in calls for "comprehensive remigration."

A similar preemptive adaptation can be detected in the cultural sphere, in attempts to discipline Southwest Asian and North African (SWANA region) artists and researchers for "unacceptable" political speech. This is a backlash against anti-colonial thinking often privately justified on pragmatic grounds, as an attempt to prevent supposed reputational harm to — and defunding of — liberal cultural institutions, and, therefore, as part of what is called a "strategy" against the far right.

Policing the Postcolonial Crisis

Nour Shantout is a Syrian Palestinian artist and researcher based in Vienna since 2015. Her work is about Palestinian embroidery and its relationship to practices of resistance. It's about war, displacement, anti-imperialism, gender, and class. All of these things interact in the tradition of women's labor that she examines, which allows her to depict complexities of Palestinian social history — in Palestine, in the refugee camps of Lebanon, and in the destroyed refugee camp of Yarmouk, Syria — with a rare level of precision.

On October 9, Shantout became the latest of several researchers to be "canceled" by the Academy of Fine Arts Vienna, after she reshared an Instagram post in her stories, for less than twenty-four hours. The post, which was written by Disorientalising, an Instagram account with 76,000 followers, and which was widely reshared after Israel stepped up its bombing campaign in Lebanon, states "'death to israel' is not just a threat. it is a moral imperative and the only acceptable solution."

Shantout was swiftly removed from her PhD program and her funding was withdrawn. In her account of these developments, circulated in academic networks in Vienna, she described how her request for due process was dismissed by the lawyer for the funding body, the Austrian Academy of Sciences, on the basis that she was guilty of incitement to racial hatred, and that her actions "contradicted decency and morality." The termination of her PhD was confirmed at a meeting that lasted less than ten minutes and was attended by University rector Johan F. Hartle, professor of postcolonial studies Christian Kravagna, and Sabeth Buchmann, the supervisor of her PhD project, all of whom are white Germans whose own work deals, directly or indirectly, with postcolonial theory.

Elite Coalitions

Writing about contemporary US politics, the philosopher Alberto Toscano has recently noted that "a *de facto* elite coalition has come together — from complicit university presidents and culture war ideologues to billionaires and elected representatives of both parties — to affirm America's commitment to Israeli impunity."

A similar conjunction can be seen in Austrian state and cultural politics across the apparent divide of left and right. Toscano's book *Late Fascism* helps us to think about the relevant dynamics, in which liberal institutions try to formally reproduce themselves in an increasingly hostile environment by preemptively evacuating themselves of any substantive content:

> Emerging or intervening in a conjuncture of crisis . . . fascism mobilises non-contemporaneity (of identities, experiences, fantasies, and so on) around a nostalgic project of regeneration, palingenesis, rebirth, grounded in a view of the present as decadence, decay, degradation, consequent upon a defeat.

The FPÖ's "nostalgic project of regeneration" could hardly be clearer. It is a project for the regeneration of a belligerently nationalist "Fortress Austria," a racially homogenous society modeled on the Austria of the 1930s with the Volkskanzler at its helm. But "complicit university presidents" have their own nostalgic projects of regeneration. This may include the teaching of "postcolonialism" by an exclusively white faculty who can be guaranteed not to raise the question of whether there is a difference between violence against people, and a fundamental transformation of a violent, ethnic-chauvinist legal-political organization or state.

At stake in this latter scenario is the possible emergence of a democratic, inclusive, nonviolent alternative. But the nostalgic consensus in the Austrian university system forecloses this possibility. It attributes unambiguous meaning to anti-colonial others, while reserving the characteristics of complexity and ambiguity for itself alone.

Questions of Safety

The abrupt termination of Shantout's studentship takes place in the wake of a number of similar cases, many of them also at Vienna's Academy of Fine Arts. These include the cancellation of a lecture by the Palestinian queer theorist Walaa Alqaisiya in 2022 as well as a "Decolonial Encounters" event in June 2024 that was ordered to move by police and abandoned by students under the police pressure.

Elsewhere in the city, in May, a video lecture by the Columbia University historian Rashid Khalidi at the University of Vienna was canceled by university authorities and had to take place informally outdoors. We were present for this lecture, and the spectacle of a professor giving a talk about human rights on Zoom, projected onto the wall of a university office and then fed via a webcam to the phones and computers of students on a lawn outside, was deeply bizarre. The indecipherable echo of scores of unsynced devices made Khalidi's presentation almost impossible to follow, but it was a perfect metaphor for the phobic character of liberal anti-Palestinian politics, which was perhaps one of his points anyway.

Slightly earlier, the University of Vienna's peaceful student encampment was dispersed by police after only a few days, while in an echo of the treatment of Shantout, protesting students at Vienna's other major art school were mocked by the

university's own rector in the pages of the main national newspaper. Her opinion piece accused them of "distorting the discourse," for speaking about the effects of the genocide on queer Palestinians.

This mixture of alarmism, ignorance, and managerial arrogance is divorced from reality, but it is also telling. Most of all it tells us something about the causes of anti-Palestinian repression, which is driven primarily by European racism, bureaucratic violence, and middle-class interest politics disguised as anti-fascist strategy. It is also premised for nostalgia — whether overtly fascist or liberal-institutional — for happier, more oblivious times past, rather than the presence or absence of a "countermajoritarian" memory culture.

The synthesis explains — but certainly doesn't justify — the actions of even postcolonial and Marxist scholars whose internalization of the far-right threat is expressed as fear of their own Palestinian students. Palestinian artists are canceled and their funding withdrawn under the rubric of "safety," without any thought about what this means for the safety of those who are thus stigmatized and excluded.

Shantout's family lives in a neighborhood of Damascus that is under regular Israeli air attack. The question of safety is very real for her. But she was never given a real opportunity to discuss, clarify, retract, or refine.

Palestine and Internationalism

Today what Toscano calls a "late-fascist" political order does not have to involve the overthrow of the liberal state but need only fuse with it. The situation in Austria shows how ostensible fear of a fascist threat at home can become a perverse *justification* for this fusion. Just as much as in Germany, it shows how fascism advances via liberal institutional complicity for so long as it is not seen from a planetary perspective, in which the situation of Palestinians is now central.

Shantout is one target of what we might call "late-fascist" cultural politics; but so, too, is the very idea of something like "postcolonial studies" in an Austrian context, which in the present scenario threatens to become a simple contradiction in terms.

On March 8 of this year, one of us, caring for their partner during the final stages of her cancer, took an hour out to attend a splinter demonstration around the International Women's Day protest in Vienna. The main protest had banned attendees from wearing keffiyehs. Shantout spoke at this splinter demo, where she delivered a speech about the need for international solidarity in feminist struggle. Rather than being treated as a scapegoat and a threat because of a single Instagram repost, she should be given the chance to explain to liberal "anti-fascists" what commitment to internationalism really means.

CONTRIBUTORS

Rose-Anne Gush is an art historian and theorist who lives and works in Graz, Austria.

Danny Hayward is working on a posthumous volume by his partner, Marina Vishmidt, who was formerly a professor of art theory at the University of Applied Arts Vienna.

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Who is it? It's Christ whose head turned into a white sun
His burial? Four planks and nails gathered in meadows
His mother? Dressed in lunar rays and white silence
His will? A 10 dollars bill posted in New York
His son? The product of the ox and the snake
His weapons? his fingernails hanging on the sun
His mother? the planet Saturn
His burial? the one of the neighbor who was made king by error
His son? the water-carrier the noise and the lightning
His will? a succession of tombs in the Center of Town
Who is it? It's Christ whose head wears a white bandage for ever
His daughter? WAR WITH NO REVOLUTION

Terms such as *freethinking* and *autonomous* are persistent characterizations of art making. While striving for independent thinking is in many ways productive and positive, in reality artistic production is both a social process and a cultural practice. Within such an open-ended framework as art school, it seems to me vitally important that the core curriculum expand its scope beyond independent work, artistic technique, and spotty art history, to focus on the investigation and analysis of the various contexts artistic production are in relation to and influenced by. These include the ideologies, histories, and current conditions of aesthetic, cultural, social, political, and economic frameworks. Correlating individuals' artistic desires with these larger contexts in a dynamic enterprise might provide, generally speaking, the means for developing critical consciousness and articulating cultural agency, which together constitute a broad agenda for contemporary art education.

crippled and his family were quite well-to-do farmers, and they retired and moved. They had a bookcase, a beautiful big glass-covered bookcase with several feet of books and ten or fifteen rows of books. I started looking at those books. I'd never seen so many books together in anybody's house. We didn't have a library in that town, and school didn't have any books, so I asked if I could read these books, and they said, "Well yes." It was a collection of old books that the family had collected, dictionaries and religious books, books on medicine, books on animal husbandry and all, dictionaries, encyclopedias—the whole collection. I said I could keep them in order if I just can go down one shelf and another, and they were amazed that anybody would read books that way.

They didn't know that I had no taste about reading at all. I just read words, and I never had a problem of having any choices to make. It never occurred to me that you picked this book against that book. You just read them all, read any book you could find. I read dictionaries. I read encyclopedias. I read dirty stories, and I read pornography, and I read religious tracts. I read whatever was next on the shelf. And I just read everything, so that's sort of a background on reading. That's why I comment on the fact that the town of Brazil didn't have any books and I didn't have any books and we couldn't afford to buy books and nobody else in that part of the country had any books, so that was a year of not being able to get books.

PAULO: But, Myles, look. As far as you can remember, how

did you relate your childhood experience before going to school with the knowledge you got, with the experience of the student Myles. You remember?

MYLES: I was always getting in trouble for reading in school. I was reading things that weren't assigned, and I'd get criticized for it. I used to put books behind the geography book because it was big, and I'd put the geography book on the desk. I wasn't smart enough to think the teacher would keep seeing me studying geography all the time and nothing else. Finally the teacher walked around while I was concentrating on my book and came in behind me. She tapped me on the shoulder and suddenly I realized that she was standing behind me seeing what was behind the geography book. I can remember exactly what I was reading. It was a series of books about the boys in India and around the world. It was a travelogue, sensational stories of adventure. And I was in India. I wasn't there in that schoolroom. The teacher actually opposed my reading because you were supposed to study, and that's supposed to take all your time, studying these lifeless textbooks that I'd already read. I'd read through the geography the first day; I didn't need to study that. I just went through that like I went through everything else. It was just another book to read to me. Then I read the Bible twice all the way through like a book. It's a great book, one of the best books I ever read. I grew up reading, and that stood me in good stead a lot of times even when I was in college later on.

THIRD PARTY: Did your mother actually teach you to read?

MYLES: I don't know how I learned to read. People used

to ask me—when I lived at Savannah and I was borrowing their books—how I learned to read so young, and I couldn't remember. I couldn't tell anybody how I learned to read.

PAULO: I read in your text,* which you read in Copenhagen, a very interesting scene, the precise moment in which you started recognizing, in a much more deepened way, the *value* of the books. That is precisely when you went on more deeply in reading *reality*, drawing from your experience. The longer ago it is, the more you began to reflect on the experience and the more you discover the value of the books.

I think that it's very interesting, because sometimes we can fall into some mistakes, for example, the mistake of denying the value of books, the value of reading, or denying the value of practice. I think we have to understand how books as theory and practice as action must be constantly dialectically together, that is, as a unity between practice and theory. I think that this is one of the most important dimensions of your own life because of what happened many years ago when you went to school. It was some years later before you started being challenged. You went to Denmark to see what happened there, but undoubtedly your experience of reading, as a boy before going to this Danish school, and your experience afterward in the school helped

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*   Myles Horton, "Influences on Highlander Research and Education Center, New Market, TN, USA," paper presented at a Grundtvig workshop, Scandinavian Seminar College, Denmark, 1983; published in *Grundtvig's Ideas in North America—Influences and Parallels* (Copenhagen: Det Danske Selskab [Danish Institute], 1983).

you to know how far school was from the experience of life, your way of trying to understand constantly what you were doing. All these things have to do with the experiences and the theory that we find inside of the practice here [at Highlander].

MYLES: At first, you see, during the period I was telling you about, I didn't connect books with life. I didn't connect books with reality. They were just entertainment, and I was just reading mechanically. That's why I didn't make any distinction between books. I had no taste or discrimination. I was just reading to read. I guess it gave me some facility in reading, but actually I didn't try to read fast, I didn't try to read for understanding. I just tried to read because I didn't have anything else to do. It was later on that I started thinking books had something in them for me. By the time I was in the high school, I was beginning to read to make sense. It was earlier that I just read everything and didn't care what was in it. I was beginning to learn there were things in books that were worth knowing, not just entertainment. I was reading more seriously, more selectively.

I can remember that I enjoyed reading Shakespeare and a lot of the classics. The rest of the students hated them because they just read excerpts and they just read them for exams. At that period I was working and I didn't have any money to buy textbooks. So I was borrowing my classmates' textbooks so I wouldn't have to buy them. That's when I learned to read fast because I had to get the books, read them fast, and get back to them. In return for that, I would slip them answers

to questions on exams. We'd trade. I'd give them the answers to the questions if they'd loan me their books.

PAULO: But, Myles, I would like to come back to some point in your reflections about reading and pleasure and the examination, for example. I also love to read because I never could separate reading and pleasure; but I'm as glad, for example, in reading a good novelist as I am glad in reading Gramsci. You see, for me, starting to read a text is first a hard task, a difficult task. It's not easy. Starting is not easy. For me what is fundamental in the role of the teacher is to help the student to discover that inside of the difficulties there is a moment of pleasure, of joy. Of course, if I am reading a novel it is easier for me because I am involved in an aesthetical event that I don't know how to finish. In some way I also may be rewriting the beauty I am reading. When I am reading Gramsci, Vygotsky, or Giroux or when I was reading your writing this morning, I also am and was in search of some beauty, which is the knowledge I have there. That is, I have to grasp in between the words some knowledge that helps me not exclusively to go on in the reading and in *understanding* what I'm reading, but also to understand something beyond the book I am reading, beyond the text. It is a pleasure. For me there is a certain sensualism in writing and reading— and in teaching, in knowing. I cannot separate them. Knowing for me is not a neutral act, not only from the political point of view, but from the point of view of my body, my sensual body. It is full of feelings, of emotions, of tastes.

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individual-led efforts within classrooms, the public discussions I'm thinking about are still largely framed through the lens of Germany and Jewish identity. It's exhausting, and I no longer find these conversations inspiring or productive. At worst, they only serve to reinforce the status quo.

TJD: In the US, repression seems to be intensifying. Noura Erakat critiques liberal institutions – universities like Columbia and Harvard, as well as cultural institutions – for laying the groundwork for neofascist assaults through what she calls 'anticipatory obedience'.[11] In an attempt to shield themselves from right-wing attacks, and instead of taking a stand, these institutions pre-emptively suppress dissent, particularly pro-Palestine speech. The result is a disturbing dynamic where any expression opposing genocide in Gaza is automatically labelled antisemitic, creating an absurd logic in which condemning mass killing is framed as an act of racism.

Dylan Rodriguez, a member of the recently created Institute for the Critical Study of Zionism in the US, discusses this as a form of *liberal and progressive counterinsurgency* – a form of pacification, isolation and domestication deployed by philanthropic organisations, think tanks, universities and museums, extending beyond and in advance of direct state repression and actual police violence.[12] This dynamic is unmistakably at play today, as liberal and progressive institutions attempt to appease rising fascism rather than confront it directly. History has shown that such strategies only lead to disaster, right? And now we are facing that very danger once again.

JM: That has been our experience here in Germany as well, the anticipation of the inevitable right-wing backlash and its mechanisms. Yet, instead of resisting, which should be the role of the left, so-called liberals pre-emptively retreat. Rather than pushing back, they throw up barriers – not against fascism, but against critical voices, effectively clearing the path for the very forces they claim to oppose. Before the backlash even arrives, they have already removed the obstacles – silencing Palestinians, erasing dissent. It is an all-too-familiar reality in Germany.

TJD: And you've had some personal experience with this.

JM: At this point, it's almost comical. Someone will invite me to screen a film, and I'll ask, *Are you sure? Are you willing to protect me against the backlash you might face for hosting me?* And their

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11 'Noura Erakat: Trump's Abuses & Mahmoud Khalil's Arrest Are Products of US Imperialism Coming Home', op cit, www.democracynow.org/2025/3/11/noura_erakat_palestine_mahmoud_khalil#transcript; also see Noura Erakat, 'The Boomerang Comes Back', Boston Review, 5 February 2025, www.bostonreview.net/articles/the-boomerang-comes-back, accessed 23 April 2025.

12 See the Institute for the Critical Study of Zionism: https://criticalzionismstudies.org/; and Dylan Rodríguez and Roberto Sirvent, 'Cops, Colleges, and Counterinsurgency: An Interview with Dylan Rodriguez', *Black Agenda Report*, 13 September 2023, https://www.blackagendareport.com/cops-colleges-and-counterinsurgency-interview-dylan-rodriguez, accessed 23 April 2025

response will be, *Well, have you ever said anything publicly about BDS* [Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions]*?* That's when it becomes clear – they are performing the work of repression themselves. They are doing the job of the police! Attempting to enforce an unconstitutional anti-BDS motion that Germany refuses to formalise into law, precisely to avoid violating its own constitutional protections on freedom of opinion. It is a farcical yet deeply insidious form of self-policing and censorship, where institutions pre-emptively silence dissent to avoid controversy, doing the work of the repressive state before the state even needs to intervene. Who needs the rightwing when so-called progressives – Die Linke voters, Green Party supporters – are already excluding Palestinian and Arab voices from cultural spaces? This began long before the genocide, as early as 2019, when institutions, to avoid controversy, quietly started deplatforming individuals remotely associated with the principles of BDS.[13]

This normalisation of censorship has been driven not by the right alone but by liberals and segments of the left – paralysed by fear, lacking vision, unwilling to take a stand. From 2019 to documenta's collapse in 2022, and now with the avalanche of repression since the genocide, it has been the same pattern. The majority of institutions that invited me and then cancelled did so under the same excuse: *We can't risk our funding. We have to protect our colleagues.* In reality, they shift blame onto the victims, saying *you* are putting *us* at risk, justifying their own cowardice.

TJD: Turning to documenta, I would love to hear your thoughts on its new Code of Conduct announced in February 2025 and approved by the institution's Managing Director (Andreas Hoffmann), shareholders and the Supervisory Board.[14] The framework explicitly endorses the IHRA definition of antisemitism – which problematically conflates criticism of Israel with anti-Jewish racism – and grants a 'scientific advisory board' the authority to assess potential violations.[15] The Code emphasises the need to prevent what it terms 'group-related misanthropy', including antisemitism, while simultaneously claiming to uphold 'humanistic, liberal, and democratic values'. Can these principles co-exist?

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[13] *Editor's note:* responding to the parliamentary BDS resolution by the Bundestag that labelled the Boycott, Divestment, Sanctions (see www.bdsmovement.net) campaign to be 'antisemitic' on 17 May 2019, some German institutions established the *Initiative GG 5.3 Weltoffenheit* (world-openness initiative) to counter repression and the foreclosure of critical discussion 'triggered by the parliamentary anti-BDS resolution'. As the 'Statement by the Initiative GG 5.3 Weltoffenheit' puts it: 'We reject the BDS boycott of Israel since we consider cultural and scientific exchange to be essential. At the same time, we consider the logic of counter-boycott, triggered by the parliamentary anti-BDS resolution, to be dangerous. By invoking this resolution, accusations of antisemitism are being misused to push aside important voices and to distort critical positions. For this reason, we have established the "Initiative GG 5.3 Weltoffenheit" (world-openness) to consolidate our expertise and efforts in order to defend a climate of diverse voices, critical reflection and an appreciation of difference.' The statement and list of institutional signatories can be found here: www.hebbel-am-ufer.de/en/about-us/profile/gg53weltoffenheit, accessed 23 April 2025.

[14] See www.documenta.de/en/code-of-conduct, accessed 23 April 2025

[15] See the first issue of the *Journal for the Critical Study of Zionism*, vol 1 no 1, Fall 2024, https://criticalzionismstudies.org/jcsz-volume-1-issue-1-fall-2024, accessed 23 April 2025

JM: It's absolute nonsense. Honestly, I can't fathom why anyone from outside Germany would take this job – what are they walking into? We've seen the avalanche of cancellations and humiliation of critical voices in the cultural sector and how the IHRA definition has been weaponised in the US, Germany, the UK and beyond. The idea that critical discourse and humanist values can co-exist with the way the IHRA has been used – as a tool to silence criticism of Israel and Zionism – is, at best, naïve. More realistically, it's a deliberate strategy to uphold Germany's rigid status quo – professing a commitment to free speech and diversity while actively silencing any critical discourse on Israel in the public sphere, including in major art exhibitions.

TJD: Yes, and the only possible outcome would seem to be, to quote Andreas Schlegel in *Kunstkritikk* magazine, a 'zombie documenta': a brain-dead repressive spectacle that has capitulated to the ideology of Zionist ethnonationalism, refusing to see this itself as a form of 'group-related misanthropy'.[16] This marks a profound betrayal of documenta's original mission as an emancipatory project of internationalism, born from the ruins of Nazi fascism's cultural nationalism. The irony is staggering, and perhaps it ultimately reveals the inherent flaws in documenta's vision of internationalism from the very start.

JM: A few years ago, the Deutsches Historisches Museum in Berlin hosted a fascinating yet largely overlooked exhibition on documenta's history, 'Documenta. Politics and Art'.[17] The show was critical, revealing unsettling truths about its origins. Documenta co-founder Werner Haftmann, for instance, was not only a Nazi Party member but also a wanted war criminal in Italy, known for hunting, torturing and executing resistance fighters. And recent research further exposes that ten of documenta's original organisers were affiliated with the Nazi Party, the SS, or the SA – Hitler's paramilitary wing. By the second edition, six former Nazis were involved; by the third, that number had risen to fifteen.[18]

So, documenta's emergence as a seeming phoenix from the ashes was, in reality, an American-led effort to reintegrate Germany under its sphere of influence – essentially a geopolitical makeover to declare the country 'denazified'. Yet, those who retained power, in the artworld as in the security apparatuses, were often still antisemites. In its early years, documenta functioned primarily as a showcase for American modernism (and Documenta 3, in 1964, was partly funded by the CIA), serving as a Cold War cultural project to align Germany with the West rather than the Soviet bloc. It framed itself as a symbol of artistic

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16 See Andreas Schlaegel, 'Zombie Documenta', *Kunstkritikk/Nordic Art Review*, 4 June 2024, https://kunstkritikk.com/zombie-documenta-2, accessed 23 April 2025

17 For more on 'Documenta. Politics and Art', 18 June 2021 – 9 January 2022, see www.dhm.de/en/exhibitions/archive/2021/documenta-politics-and-art, accessed 23 April 2025.

18 See Kate Brown, 'A Startling Exhibition on the History of Documenta Reveals the Political Moves – and Nazi Ties – of Its First Curators', *Artnet*, 24 June 2021, https://news.artnet.com/art-world/politics-art-documenta-1982336, accessed 23 April 2025

freedom, but in truth it was an ideological cover-up, masking the fact that true denazification never fully took place.

Many of the structures of Nazi and right-wing ethnonationalist power in Germany have endured. Yet there was a moment, particularly after reunification and the Cold War, when it seemed like Germany was beginning to engage with the world differently – opening up to perspectives from the Global South. Okwui Enwezor's documenta 11 in 2002 was a pivotal moment in this shift, standing out as one of the most significant editions in the history of this deeply problematic institution. Twenty years ago, there was a real sense that Germany was undergoing a transformation, that it was becoming more inclusive, and that migrant voices might finally be able to reshape its cultural and intellectual discourse.

TJD: I went to documenta 11 myself, was powerfully moved by it, and definitely thought something like that was happening, in a very positive way.

JM: I've asked my (remaining) German friends what they thought – was it all just an illusion? Was there ever a genuine effort to become a more globalised country, to dismantle white supremacy, antisemitism and xenophobia, or was it merely a fleeting facade? Was there a real attempt that was ultimately crushed? Whatever brief opening existed in the 1990s and 2000s, it feels now as though Germany has regressed, returning to an earlier era.

TJD: In Germany, decolonisation as a political force does feel like a fading echo – its momentum stalled within universities, its presence diminished in funded research. If not entirely extinguished, it lingers more as a memory than a living praxis, a vision once urgent, now quietly receding.

JM: True decolonisation – one that would mean the abolition of Zionism – is just not on the table. Far from it. Instead, Germany engages in surface-level reconciliations, a performative reckoning with its colonial past in Namibia or a selective embrace of Black lives that often veers into cultural appropriation. They can appoint Joe Chialo as Berlin's cultural senator, but his politics align with staunch Zionism and the suppression of Palestinian solidarity. A similar void – or calculated, enforced silence – reigns at HKW (the cultural space, Haus der Kulturen der Welt) when it comes to Palestine. It feels like decisions are steered by securing funding and legitimacy from those in power. When your mission is to build community how do you justify pre-emptive exclusions?

TJD: It does expose the ultimate failure of liberal identity politics. In the UK, recent Conservative Party leaders have been Black British and of South Asian descent; in the US, figures like Barack Obama and Kamala Harris – both complicit in supporting the genocide in Gaza – embody this contradiction. Today, violent colonialism and domination can just as easily be led by people of colour. As Asad Haider argues in his book *Mistaken Identity: Mass*

XL

the sun is a camera which operates only in black and white
white white white is the color of Terror
from their eyes nothing remains but egg-white and trees! blackness
in the underground blackroom always black is   experience

the sun is counting the earth's rotations   automobile wheel
and on the Palestinian's head rolls a truck
a concrete roof collapsed on 500 bodies
and the sun took the picture for the C.I.A.'s archives
sun camera majestic lens Prince of the gaze
white white is the result of the sun's clicking
when teeth become as white as eyes
the sun executioner focal point of death   goes into action
blood has no color in the torture-chambers
infrared rays make writings on the calcinated bodies of the Arabs

explain by example relationships of art and artists to the gallery space. But *Inside the White Cube* is not an art-historical text. Rather it is a hybrid form made from a mixture of empirical, analytic, academic, and journalistic methods. *Inside the White Cube* is in part a critique of "the economic model of art as product." For O'Doherty, art as "portable currency" necessitates the stripped-down, controlled context of the white cube: art and context are understood to be conjoined, mutually producing one another.

The white-cube-style space, as well as modernist-style installation design, are descendants of strategies used to produce exhibition contexts for modern art—strategies that were originally devised through curatorial engagement with the circumstances of exhibiting particular art at a particular time. In museum and gallery culture, particularly in the US, the white cube—with variances—continues to be a favored architectural setting for contemporary art exhibitions. It provides an idealized environment distinct from the referential space of society. In the contemporary art space the systematic stripping away of anything that might connect art to social processes and the world outside is common practice. Devoid of decoration, windows, seating, or other furniture, and of course whitened with paint, according to O'Doherty, white-cube-style spaces are "constructed along laws as rigorous as those for building a medieval church." The ubiquity of such spaces renders them nearly invisible, thereby consolidating their power to reinforce and reproduce existing power configurations. One thing is clear: the white-cube-style space as a reproducible apparatus serves a cultural economy in which art is defined by its status as marketable product.

On a parallel track, modernist-style display continues to be widely favored as an installation mode for contemporary art. Many exhibitions deploy a museological mode of display, which assigns genius to the artist and masterpiece status to the curated artworks. The presenting institution—whether it be a gallery, a kunsthalle, or a museum—considers and promotes itself as

arbiter of superiority. The viewer is offered a relatively passive role as witness. These interlocking goals are articulated through the theatricals of spatialization, lighting, wall texts, and other devices. In such a setup, artworks are hung at widely spaced intervals and at just below median eye level.

Why do some practices become convention over others? It is doubtful that the sustained proliferation of the white-cube-style space in tandem with modernist-style display represents simple laziness. More likely, adherence to these—as conventions— represents resistance to rethinking the terms of art after modernism. Display methods developed in specific museum contexts (i.e., Barr at MoMA) have perhaps been adopted by curators, gallerists, and artists, not only to appropriate and invoke the aura of the museum but to distinguish art from common goods. As contemporary art has become more and more institutionalized, and the art industry has increasingly consolidated as a marketplace, distinguishing art from other products is perhaps viewed as a necessary strategy to protect its historical, symbolic value as a cultural category. In opposition to the crowded, repetition-based arrangements of the common supermarket, spaciousness communicates symbolic value and the authority of uniqueness. The amount of wall real estate awarded an artwork signifies value and position within the hierarchical logic system of the art industry. The sheer volume of white-cube-style spaces narrativized by modernist origins and display techniques suggests a nostalgia for, and allegiance to, modernism at large in the art world. Similarly, conventional display modes, which treat art and artifacts as autonomous, generic examples of a medium, i.e., photography or painting, can be interpreted as representative of a longing for clear-cut divisions between mediums.

Exhibitions are key intersections where art and artifacts are made available to audiences, within which narratives, ideas, and sensations are activated. It is precisely because of the power that exhibitions and display have in assigning, determining, or opening up

meanings that modernist-style installation convention needs to be challenged. The notion that content can simply be inserted into existing exhibition and display forms as though those forms were neutral, or as though artistic production were generic, is deeply problematic. Art is at risk of being confined by its presentation rather than expanded and suitably contextualized. What might appear as an expansive and reverential installation, while entirely appropriate for some artworks (modern or otherwise), is inappropriate for others. What Staniszweski calls "convenient professional formulas," applied indiscriminately, may have a distorting effect. Installation convention can neutralize and objectify vital artistic practices and related social processes.

Adherence to conventions that dictate according to a set of rules and procedures is by definition contradictory to a contextual process. Modernist-style display—as convention—has been institutionalized to the degree where it is taken for granted and seems natural. Yet modernist aestheticized installation was developed through a contextual approach to particular art; principles of display emerged from congruent principles in modern art itself. This model demonstrates how a contextual approach to installation design and display can render solutions that activate art and viewer. But a contextual approach to installation requires presentational modes to be considered mutable and contingent. It implies approaching the activities of installation design and display anew in relation to particular contents, materials, and circumstances. The challenge is to fashion presentational environments that take into account not only the context(s) the artworks/practices derived from but also the context being constructed in an exhibition. Alternative exhibition strategies that defy convention and propose contextual approaches potentially challenge the very categorizations and hierarchies by which relations in the art industry are reproduced.

Despite the ubiquity of modernist-style display conventions, innovation and intervention in the field of installation design is ongoing. There are countless artists and curators throughout

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opposed to creating an unremarked window to a source text or ultimately an ur-code and perpetuating authoritativeness in the realm and marketplace of ideas, an academic quote understood artistically becomes a query into its own code without loss of legibility. Not only does the quote still perform its function, it becomes a way for the author or quoter to assume full responsibility for being a deictic dependent on co-text and co-authorship for identity. An artistic quotation of academic language participates in framing academic language as a site for learning – within and beyond academia – about the interdependency necessarily involved in language-based comprehension and communication. In order that artistic ways of research and knowing reinforce citation's role in the politics of community – and that, vice versa, citational politics might actualize artistic research's "potential to disrupt entrenched power relations", as Capous-Desyllas and Morgaine note in *Creating Social Change Through Creativity* – academic quotation and academic citational practices must first be examined in three interrelated ways: First, there is citation's technical role in academic writing – to cite; secondly, its quantitative role in academic capitalism – to be cited; and, thirdly, its political role in academic positionality – to uncite.[4]

Under the rubric of citation's technical role in academic writing or the mechanics of citation, we might list the following activities: referencing sources to bolster our argumentation or be authoritative; avoiding plagiarism; giving credit where it is due; relating to other works, thoughts, and voices; and the applicable apparatuses of academic writing like footnotes. We even might go as far as thinking of how texts quoting one another amounts to an intertextuality, to a polyphony of authors' voices, even to knowledge as shared. Those in academia tasked with teaching how to write – or quote – academically, like English language professors, are correct to view the intertextuality, polyphony, and shared knowledge that is created through citing and quoting as indissociable from topics such as "intellectual property and … scholarly productivity as a factor in a capitalistic economy, as Shirley K. Rose puts it in her article "What's Love Got to Do with It? Scholarly Citation Practices as Courtship Rituals."[5]

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4   Moshoula Capous-Desyllas and Karen Morgaine, *Creating Social Change Through Creativity* (Cham: Palgrave Macmillan, 2018), 1.

5   Shirley K. Rose, "What's Love Got to Do with It? Scholarly Citation Practices as Courtship Rituals", *Language and Learning Across the Disciplines* 1, no. 3 (August 1996): 35.

In connection to academic capitalism, citation becomes a unit of measurement of an article's, an author's, a journal's success. Of course, beware, "citation counts are not a measure of quality as articles may be cited for both negative as well as positive reasons", as Arizona State University's Library Guides inform us.[6] And citations do provide for a form of big data analysis – that is, citation analysis – that can indeed create new knowledge. But unfortunately, as Órla O'Donovan writes in "What is to be done about the enclosures of the academic publishing oligopoly?", "[b]y 2013, more than half of all academic journal articles in the social science [sic] and humanities were published by five publishers (Elsevier, Taylor & Francis, Wiley-Blackwell, Springer, and Sage)."[7] And citation seems to be the currency of this sordid system of double, nay, triple dipping. De Gruyter, the German scholarly publishing house, even advertises its publications by means of a citation counter. When authors submit to this, they do not even care who has cited them, whether it's been for a negative or positive reason. Citation is a tangible quantifiable, much more than just an unremarked or ignorable window from one text into another.

Citation or academic quoting is a socioculturally situated practice. The sociologist and linguist Ruth Finnegan, in her book *Why Do We Quote?: The Culture and History of Quotation*, states that "[u]sing the appropriate quoting conventions is now a recognised route and a condition for accessing and retaining membership of the scholarly community."[8] Interestingly enough, it is precisely again two English professors in the 1990s concerned with their students learning how to write academically who delve into how learning how to write academically might in fact mean, in Baynham's words, "learning how to take up a writing position", that is, the position of the citing or quoting "scholarly 'I'"; "an authoritative position with regard to the quoted other."[9] But as Ron Scollon shows in his article "As a Matter

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6   "Citation Research and Impact Metrics: Citation Counts for Articles", LibGuides at Arizona State University, last modified December 20, 2021,
    https://libguides.asu.edu/citation/citationcountsarticles.

7   Órla O'Donovan, "What is to be done about the enclosures of the academic publishing oligopoly?", *Community Development Journal* 54, no. 3 (July 2019): 364.

8   Ruth Finnegan, *Why do we quote?: The Culture and History of Quotation* (Cambridge: Open Book Publishers, 2011), 283.

9   Mike Baynham, "Double-voicing and the scholarly 'I': On incorporating the words of others in academic discourse", *Text & Talk* 19, no. 4 (1999): 485.

of Fact: The Changing Ideology of Authorship and Responsibility in Discourse", this "original, creative, rational and individualistic authorial self expected in English academic writing" is, it turns out, "in conflict with … the culturally constructed selves of non-native speaking students of English."[10] Unfortunately, neither paper was ever heavily cited. The academic positionality of the academic quoter is somehow cultureless, whiteblind, and this is of course why gender, ethnic, and racial biases implicitly filter who is (not) quoting who and why on closer examination we get traceable "exclusionary citational practices." Citational genealogies become reified, voices are erased, whether or not they were first appropriated, that is, not cited. How can we take all this into account, cite and academically quote differently, so that truly new shared knowledge is produced?

In Ruth Finnegan's *Why Do We Quote?: The Culture and History of Quotation*, there is an appendix entitled "Quoting the Academics" in which Finnegan discusses how little research has ever been done into the academic conception of citation per se; in it she writes that "amidst this profusion [of a postmodern interest in 'topics of intertextuality, originality and appropriation'] there seemed no direct treatment of the questions teasing me: about just what 'quotation' and 'quoting' were, how in practice they had been handled and conceptualised, and how we had got to where we are now."[11] However, the genealogy of critical inquiry into academic citation is not missing – in fact, it is intersectionally feminist. The book Feminist Ethnography: Thinking Through Methodologies, Challenges, and Possibilities by Christa Craven and Dána-Ain Davis reminds us that "the role of citational politics in feminist ethnography" is considerable and dates back to the 1990s.[12] For example, as Craven and Davis note, in 1995 the anthropologist Lynn Bolles "deliver[ed] a paper in which she strategically cited only women of color to underscore the ways in which their work was so often omitted from the (feminist) anthropological canon. … Bolles shifted the focus from critiquing whom we do not cite … to becoming actively engaged with

10   Ron Scollon, "As a matter of fact: The changing ideology of authorship and responsibility in discourse", *World Englishes* 13, no. 1 (March 1994): 33.

11   Ruth Finnegan, *Why do we quote?: The Culture and History of Quotation* (Cambridge: Open Book Publishers, 2011), 269.

12   Christa Craven and Dána-Ain Davis, *Feminist Ethnography: Thinking Through Methodologies, Challenges, and Possibilities* (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2016), 65.

locating diverse scholarship in order to influence our work and knowledge development."[13] This book also reproduces writing by Sara Ahmed, the feminist writer, scholar, and activist, in which she states, "I would describe citation as a rather successful reproductive technology, a way of reproducing the world around certain bodies."[14] Ahmed, in her book *What's the Use?: On the Uses of Use*, states that "[i]n order to craft new knowledge, we might have to cite differently: citation as how we can refuse to be erased."[15] And in her *Living a Feminist Life*, Ahmed states in the first person the following: "I think as feminists we can hope to create a crisis around citation, even just a hesitation, a wondering, that might help us not to follow the well-trodden citational paths. If you aim to create a crisis in citation, you tend to become the cause of a crisis."[16]

This was true, for example, for bell hooks when in 1981 she published her first book, *Ain't I Woman: Black Women and Feminism*, as she explains in her book *Talking Back: Thinking Feminist, Thinking Black*:

the issue of class and its relationship to who one's reading audience might be came up for me around my decision not to use footnotes, for which I have been sharply criticized. I told people that my concern was that footnotes set class boundaries for readers, determining who a book is for. I was shocked that many academic folks scoffed at this idea. I shared that I went into working-class black communities as well as talked with family and friends to survey whether or not they ever read books with footnotes and found that they did not. A few did not know what they were, but most folks saw them as indicating that a book was for college-educated people. These responses influenced my decision. When some of my more radical, college-educated friends freaked out about the absence of footnotes, I seriously questioned how we could ever imagine revolutionary transformation of society if such a small shift in direction could be viewed as threatening.[17]

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13   Craven and Davis, *Feminist Ethnography*, 66.
14   Ibid., 68.
15   Sara Ahmed, *What's the Use?: On the Uses of Use* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2019), 212.
16   Sara Ahmed, *Living a Feminist Life* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2016), 148.
17   bell hooks, *Talking Back: Thinking Feminist, Thinking Black* (New York: Routledge, 2015), 81.

hooks' consideration and inclusion of those outside of academia and academic languaging led her to drop the apparatuses of citation completely and therefore suspend her own academic positionality.

A major contemporary source of critical epistemic reflection on citational practices is the field of so-called youth participatory action research (YPAR), which, among others, Michelle Fine has been developing at the City University of New York since the 1990s. According to Berkeley's YPAR Hub, YPAR seeks to "[r]edefine who has the expertise to produce knowledge to our world – not just professional adult researchers but young people who are living the issues they are studying."[18] And the Canadian journal *in:cite*, in its being "by, for, and created with young people", has a "desire to change exclusionary citational practices."[19] Another proponent of YPAR is Eve Tuck, a Canadian professor of critical race and indigenous studies who uses indigenous methodologies to collaborate with youth and communities. Tuck's "research with … her youth co-researchers" frames, for example, Tuck's decisions to "break up" with Deleuze instead of wanting to make him "say something he was not saying about desire", something agentic.[20] Co-research, research *with* again helps us see how seriously exclusionary citational practices need to be taken. Moreover, Tuck reminds us in the introduction to *Indigenous and Decolonizing Studies in Education* that "[o]ften it seems that settler readers read like settlers (that is, read extractively) for particular content to be removed for future use. The reading is like panning for gold, … sorting it by what is useful and what is discardable."[21] (15) Thanks to such work it becomes clear how citation is central to the colonization of knowledge.

Frustration with participating in the sordid world of exclusionary academic publishing moved me and the artist and curator Vojtěch Novák to make use of all the academic publications we had downloaded for artistic purposes from shadow libraries. How can artistic treatment of academic

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18   "YPAR Hub", accessed April 25, 2022, http://yparhub.berkeley.edu/.

19   "About the Journal", in:cite journal, last modified February 8, 2022,
       https://incitejournal.org/index.php/incite/about.

20   Eve Tuck, "Breaking up with Deleuze: Desire and Valuing the Irreconcilable", *International Journal of Qualitative Studies in Education* 23, no. 5 (2010): 635–636.

21   Eve Tuck, "Losing Patience for the Task of Convincing Settlers to Pay Attention to Indigenous Ideas", in *Indigenous and Decolonizing Studies in Education,* eds. Linda Tuhiwai Smith, Eve Tuck, and K. Wayne Yang (New York: Routledge, 2019), 15.

citation support anti-oppressive and community-building research into knowledge production, especially knowledge elitism? Initially a way to visually expound our discursive dependence on others, our resulting book entitled *Samizdat Contrefaçon* came to symbolize a synthesis of our theory-ladenness and our desire to communicate plainly. The method of direct quotation we employed extends to not only texts or the writing of others but also many of the other components of a book or publication like margins, page head(line)s, dedications, author biographies, or pages intentionally left blank (*vacat* pages) as well as, in the spirit of a holistic exploration of the materiality of language, the reader or quoter.

1. Andrew Hauner and Vojtěch Novák, Scan of Recto and Verso Spread (Ballpoint Pen & Laser Toner) from *Samizdat Contrefaçon*, 2018–2019.

lem for theorists who seek to isolate the stage object as a focus of semiotic inquiry, among them Shoshana Avigal and Shlomith Rimmon-Kenan, Anne Ubersfeld, and Gay McAuley. These "second wave" theater semioticians build on the insights of the influential group of semioticians known as the Prague school. While much of the Prague school's analysis focused on what it called "verbal art," in the 1940s several members (some of whom were theater practitioners as well as critics) were drawn to the theater as a laboratory of analyzable signs and sign systems. The Prague critics' analysis of the theatrical sign laid the theoretical foundation for subsequent work on theatrical objects and raised the fundamental questions with which any rigorous study of props must begin: what is a stage object, and how does it signify?[10]

Fundamental to the Prague critics' analysis is the principle of semiotization, according to which "[a]ll that is on the stage is a sign."[11] Simply by being placed on stage, a chair acquires an invisible set of quotation marks and becomes the sign "chair." Umberto Eco calls this phenomenon ostension, which he defines as "de-realizing a given object in order to make it stand for an entire class."[12] On stage, the object's signifying function eclipses its practical function, so that in performance "things serve only to the extent that they mean."[13] Semiotization obtains even in cases of what Keir Elam calls "iconic *identity*," in which the stage object is identical to what it represents.[14]

Prague school theorist Petr Bogatryev pushed the semiotization argument one step further by arguing that stage objects become "signs of a material object's sign."[15] In performance, the material sign-vehicle absorbs the abstract connotations associated with the object it represents. These "real world" connotations (royalty, say, in the case of a throne) then *replace* that represented object in the mind of the spectator. For Bogatryev, the onstage throne is thus not merely the sign of an object (throne) but the "sign of the [represented] object's sign" (royalty). Any stage chair is thus doubly abstracted from a real chair: first, as a representative of the class of chairs (Eco's ostension), and second, as a sign of the material chair's abstract connotations. As proof, Bogatryev claims that it does not matter to an audience whether a diamond necklace on stage is in fact fake, since

that audience will imaginatively leap over both the material sign-vehicle (fake necklace) and its denotation (genuine necklace) to the "sign of the object's sign" (fabulous wealth). For Bogatryev, all stage objects are thus "signs of signs."

In the late 1960s, theorist Tadeusz Kowzan extended the semiotization principle still further. Kowzan argues that each connotation (signified) accrued by the stage object may in turn become a signifier of a new connotation at the next level of meaning. Kowzan cites a famous prop, Chekhov's eponymous seagull, as an example:

> The stuffed sea-gull, an accessory in Chekhov's play, is the sign, at the first degree, of a recently killed sea-gull; this is the sign, at the second degree (or symbol in the current language) of an abstract idea (failed aspiration to freedom) which is in turn the sign of the hero's mood in the play. To be more precise, we can say that the *signifié* of the sign at the first degree, is linked to the *signifiant* of the sign at the second degree; the *signifié* of the latter is linked to the *signifiant* of the sign at the third degree and so on (the phenomenon of connotation).[16]

In this way, writes Kowzan, "a simple prop, passing through intermediate stages, becomes the sign of the master-idea of the play."[17] Whether one accepts Kowzan's theory of what might be called semiotic bootstrapping, or even Bogatryev's "signs of signs" argument, the principle of semiotization seems an unavoidable corollary of any theatrical event.

However, if all that is on stage is a sign, it becomes very difficult to decide what on stage *isn't* an object. What about the body of the actor, for instance? What of a sound effect such as a doorbell, a visual effect such as fog, or an olfactory effect such as the smell of bacon? According to the Prague school principle of "dynamism," a single material sign-vehicle can convey an unlimited number of meanings in the course of a given performance: an umbrella can become a weapon, a walking stick, a toy, an emblem of middle-class conformity, and so on.[18] Conversely, any material object can "play" a given role. Chekhov's gull might be represented by a real bird, an old boot,

a cardboard cutout, or conceivably by the mimed gesture of the actor. Iconic resemblance is not a prerequisite for signification; in nonillusionistic traditions, such as the Chinese theater, "A real object may be substituted on the set by a symbol if this symbol is able to transfer the object's own signs to itself."[19]

Moreover, as Jindřich Honzl points out, any given signified may be passed along a chain of material signifiers, and even relayed from one theatrical sign-system to another, within a performance.[20] For example, a thunderstorm might be conveyed now by a prop umbrella, now by a lighting effect, now by a sound effect, now by a line of dialogue ("It's raining cats and dogs out there").[21] But if anything on stage can in principle stand for anything else, and if any given signified can be conveyed by any sign-vehicle on stage, including light and sound, the distinction between object and nonobject dissolves into a free play of signs.

In his landmark article "Man and Object in the Theater," Prague school theorist Jiří Veltruský acknowledged this difficulty of separating subject from object and instead posited a fluid continuum between subjects and objects on stage.[22] In Elam's gloss, objects are "promoted" up the scale "when they are raised from their 'transparent' functional roles to a position of unexpected prominence" and acquire "semiotic subjectivity" independent of the actor.[23] To use Veltruský's own example, a stage dagger might move from being a passive emblem of the wearer's status to participating in the action as an instrument of murder, and thence to a final independent association with the concept "murder." Conversely, when the actor's "action force" is reduced to zero, the actor takes on the status of a mere prop (e.g., a spear-carrier or corpse). Actor and prop are dynamic sign-vehicles that move up and down the subject-object continuum as they acquire and shed action force in the course of a given performance. For Veltruský, an object becomes a prop when it begins to take part in the action overtly as a tool; and when props acquire independent signifying force, "we perceive them as spontaneous subjects, equivalent to the figure of the actor."[24]

Veltruský's intriguing concept of "action force" remains murky. If the dagger becomes a subject not when it directly participates in the

stage action (by stabbing somebody), but by signifying "murder," then isn't any object that conveys an abstract idea independent of an actor—the portrait of the general in *Hedda Gabler,* for instance, or the count's boots in *Miss Julie*—a subject?[25] We recall that for Bogatryev, *all* theatrical "signs of signs" possess the connotative ability to stand for an abstract idea associated with the represented object rather than for the object itself. The "semiotic subjectivity," or "action force," of objects seems as universal as semiotization itself.[26] No sooner does an object arrogate attention to itself than it becomes a subject in its own right; thus Veltruský's examples of "semiotic subjectivity" include a ticking clock on an empty stage. But can such an object truly be said to become a "subject" equivalent to the actor in the minds of the audience?

Second-wave theater semioticians, who rediscovered and extended the Prague circle's work on the theatrical sign in the late 1960s and early 1970s, tended to explore the dynamics of signification outlined by Bogatryev and Honzl rather than to pursue Veltruský's elusive concept of action force. Thus Kowzan developed his idea of levels of connotation, while Umberto Eco insisted that stage objects are not only signs of signs, but signs of the ideology *behind* the object's sign.[27] Such theoretical refinements threatened a bottomless *mise-en-abîme* of theatrical signification (signs of signs of signs of . . .). The axiomatic leap from the stage object's materiality to its sign function continued to risk theorizing the material object out of existence.

The attempt to pin down the "object" of semiotic inquiry reached a plateau in 1981, with the arrival of two studies that acknowledged the frustrations inherent in the Prague school account of the theatrical sign. In their ambitious attempt to outline a methodology for the semiotic study of theatrical objects, Shoshana Avigal and Shlomith Rimmon-Kenan concede that "[t]he very word 'object' is problematic, since it designates both a 'thing' and the functioning of this 'thing' within a system of interrelations with other components of the system ('object' in relation to 'subject')."[28] Avigal and Rimmon-Kenan deal with this problem by provisionally locating the object solely through its function as a "lexeme," a unit of theatrical meaning:

In our opinion, a definition of an object as such cannot be given a priori, but only relative to its functioning as a lexeme, i.e., a sign which can be listed in the "dictionary" (lexicon) created by the specific performance. As a lexeme, the object can take part in "sentences" which can be analyzed linguistically, although they are not completely verbal.[29]

A consequence of this functional approach is that, as the authors admit, the list of potential stage objects "runs the risk of being infinite."[30]

In a similar way, semiotician Anne Ubersfeld categorizes both textual and scenic items as theatrical "objects" that overlap as lexemes, even though they are not homologous.[31] Ubersfeld argues that the theatrical object is "a crossroads, or rather a braiding *(tressage)* of semiotic functions, which is to say, properly speaking, a text." Like Avigal and Rimmon-Kenan, Ubersfeld concedes that "from the moment a theatrical object is a text, it becomes hard to treat it as a discrete unit whose combinations can be studied."[32] By the early 1980s, the semiotic study of the theatrical object had reached an impasse. If "in the theater there are only objects," as Ubersfeld proclaimed, how can we distinguish material things from other signifying "objects" such as actors, gestures, or lighting effects?[33]

From Sign to Prop:
(Re)materializing the Stage Object

The stage property offers a way to rescue the material object from the ocean of signs limned by theater semiotics, and indeed, to distinguish the prop from other material objects on stage. As we have seen, the *OED* defines a prop as "[a]ny portable article, as an article of costume or furniture, used in acting a play: a stage requisite, appurtenance, or accessory." But such a capacious definition fails to distinguish between props and other onstage items. A prop can be more rigorously defined as *a discrete, material, inanimate object that is visibly manipulated by an actor in the course of performance.*

It follows that a stage object must be "triggered" by an actor in

order to become a prop (objects shifted by stagehands between scenes do not qualify). Thus a hat or sword remains an article of costume until an actor removes or adjusts it, and a chair remains an item of furniture unless an actor shifts its position.[34] When Lear sits on a stationary throne, the throne remains a set piece, but when Hamlet knocks over the chair on seeing his father's ghost in the "closet scene" (a piece of stage business invented by Thomas Betterton that became canonical in the seventeenth century), the chair becomes a prop. Such manipulation does not have to be manual; an actor might kick the chair, for example. If an actor stumbles over a chair unintentionally, the chair becomes for the nonce an unwitting prop.

The distinction between props and other kinds of stage object, then, is a matter neither of diminutive size nor potential portability but actual *motion.* The prop must physically move or alter in some way as a result of the actor's physical intervention.[35] Unlike other critics, I emphasize the criterion of *manipulation* rather than *portability* because for theater practitioners, stationary items such as radios become props once an actor turns them on or otherwise adjusts them.[36] The criterion of manipulation also clarifies the fuzzy distinction between props and stage furniture: large items that are actually shifted by an actor, such as Mother Courage's wagon, qualify as props whatever their size. Smaller items that are potentially portable but never manipulated by actors do not, even if they play a significant symbolic role (like the general's portrait in *Hedda Gabler*). To paraphrase British psychoanalyst D. W. Winnicott's famous remark about the baby, "[T]here is no such thing as a prop"; wherever a prop exists, an actor-object interaction exists. *Irrespective of its signifying function(s),* a prop is something an object becomes, rather than something an object is.

In the most extensive analysis of Shakespeare's props to date, Frances Teague offers a functional rather than descriptive definition. Teague claims that props are defined by their "dislocated function":

A *property* is an object, mimed or tangible, that occurs onstage, where it functions differently from the way it functions offstage. At the moment when the audience notes its entry into the dra-

26 May 2016

IHRA non-legally binding working definition of antisemitism

Adopted by the IHRA Plenary in Bucharest

In the spirit of the Stockholm Declaration that states: "With humanity still scarred by …antisemitism and xenophobia the international community shares a solemn responsibility to fight those evils" the committee on Antisemitism and Holocaust Denial called the IHRA Plenary in Budapest 2015 to adopt the following working definition of antisemitism.

On 26 May 2016, the Plenary in Bucharest decided to:

> **Adopt the following non-legally binding working definition of antisemitism:**
>
> **"Antisemitism is a certain perception of Jews, which may be expressed as hatred toward Jews. Rhetorical and physical manifestations of antisemitism are directed toward Jewish or non-Jewish individuals and/or their property, toward Jewish community institutions and religious facilities."**

To guide IHRA in its work, the following examples may serve as illustrations:

Manifestations might include the targeting of the state of Israel, conceived as a Jewish collectivity. However, criticism of Israel similar to that leveled against any other country cannot be regarded as antisemitic. Antisemitism frequently charges Jews with conspiring to harm humanity, and it is often used to blame Jews for "why things go wrong." It is expressed in speech, writing, visual forms and action, and employs sinister stereotypes and negative character traits.

Contemporary examples of antisemitism in public life, the media, schools, the workplace, and in the religious sphere could, taking into account the overall context, include, but are not limited to:

- Calling for, aiding, or justifying the killing or harming of Jews in the name of a radical ideology or an extremist view of religion.
- Making mendacious, dehumanizing, demonizing, or stereotypical allegations about Jews as such or the power of Jews as collective — such as, especially but not exclusively, the myth about a world Jewish conspiracy or of Jews controlling the media, economy, government or other societal institutions.
- Accusing Jews as a people of being responsible for real or imagined wrongdoing committed by a single Jewish person or group, or even for acts committed by non-Jews.
- Denying the fact, scope, mechanisms (e.g. gas chambers) or intentionality of the genocide of the Jewish people at the hands of National Socialist Germany and its supporters and accomplices during World War II (the Holocaust).
- Accusing the Jews as a people, or Israel as a state, of inventing or exaggerating the Holocaust.
- Accusing Jewish citizens of being more loyal to Israel, or to the alleged priorities of Jews worldwide, than to the interests of their own nations.
- Denying the Jewish people their right to self-determination, e.g., by claiming that the existence of a State of Israel is a racist endeavor.
- Applying double standards by requiring of it a behavior not expected or demanded of any other democratic nation.
- Using the symbols and images associated with classic antisemitism (e.g., claims of Jews killing Jesus or blood libel) to characterize Israel or Israelis.
- Drawing comparisons of contemporary Israeli policy to that of the Nazis.
- Holding Jews collectively responsible for actions of the state of Israel.

Antisemitic acts are criminal when they are so defined by law (for example, denial of the Holocaust or distribution of antisemitic materials in some countries).

Criminal acts are antisemitic when the targets of attacks, whether they are people or property – such as buildings, schools, places of worship and cemeteries – are selected because they are, or are perceived to be, Jewish or linked to Jews.

Antisemitic discrimination is the denial to Jews of opportunities or services available to others and is illegal in many countries.

Jerusalem Declaration on Antisemitism

Preamble

We, the undersigned, present the Jerusalem Declaration on Antisemitism, the product of an initiative that originated in Jerusalem. We include in our number international scholars working in Antisemitism Studies and related fields, including Jewish, Holocaust, Israel, Palestine, and Middle East Studies. The text of the Declaration has benefited from consultation with legal scholars and members of civil society.

Inspired by the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the 1969 Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Racial Discrimination, the 2000 Declaration of the Stockholm International Forum on the Holocaust, and the 2005 United Nations Resolution on Holocaust Remembrance, we hold that while antisemitism has certain distinctive features, the fight against it is inseparable from the overall fight against all forms of racial, ethnic, cultural, religious, and gender discrimination.

Conscious of the historical persecution of Jews throughout history and of the universal lessons of the Holocaust, and viewing with alarm the reassertion of antisemitism by groups that mobilize hatred and violence in politics, society, and on the internet, we seek to provide a usable, concise, and historically-informed core definition of antisemitism with a set of guidelines.

The Jerusalem Declaration on Antisemitism responds to the "IHRA Definition", the document that was adopted by the International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance (IHRA) in 2016. Because the IHRA Definition is unclear in key respects and widely open to different interpretations, it has caused confusion and generated controversy, hence weakening the fight against antisemitism. Noting that it calls itself "a working definition", we have sought to improve on it by offering (a) a clearer core definition and (b) a coherent set of guidelines. We hope this will be helpful for monitoring and combating antisemitism, as well as for educational purposes. We propose our non-legally binding Declaration as an alternative to the IHRA Definition. Institutions that have already adopted the IHRA Definition can use our text as a tool for interpreting it.

The IHRA Definition includes 11 "examples" of antisemitism, 7 of which focus on the State of Israel. While this puts undue emphasis on one arena, there is a widely-felt need for clarity on the limits of legitimate political speech and action concerning Zionism, Israel, and Palestine. Our aim is twofold: (1) to strengthen the fight against antisemitism by clarifying what it is and how it is manifested, (2) to protect a space for an open debate about the vexed question of the future of Israel/Palestine. We do not all share the same political views and we are not seeking to promote a partisan political agenda. Determining that a controversial view or action is not antisemitic implies neither that we endorse it nor that we do not.

The guidelines that focus on Israel-Palestine (numbers 6 to 15) should be taken together. In general, when applying the guidelines each should be read in the light of the others and always with a view to context. Context can include the intention behind an utterance, or a pattern of speech over time, or even the identity of the speaker, especially when the subject is Israel or Zionism. So, for example, hostility to Israel could be an expression of an antisemitic animus, or it could be a reaction to a human rights violation, or it could be the emotion that a Palestinian person feels on account of their experience at the hands of the State. In short, judgement and sensitivity are needed in applying these guidelines to concrete situations.

Definition

Antisemitism is discrimination, prejudice, hostility or violence against Jews as Jews (or Jewish institutions as Jewish).

Guidelines

A. General

1. It is racist to essentialize (treat a character trait as inherent) or to make sweeping negative generalizations about a given population. What is true of racism in general is true of antisemitism in particular.

2. What is particular in classic antisemitism is the idea that Jews are linked to the forces of evil. This stands at the core of many anti-Jewish fantasies, such as the idea of a Jewish conspiracy in which "the Jews" possess hidden power that they use to promote their own collective agenda at the expense of other people. This linkage between Jews and evil continues in the present: in the fantasy that "the Jews" control governments with a "hidden hand", that they own the banks, control the media, act as "a state within a state", and are responsible for spreading disease (such as Covid-19). All these features can be instrumentalized by different (and even antagonistic) political causes.

3. Antisemitism can be manifested in words, visual images, and deeds. Examples of antisemitic words include utterances that all Jews are wealthy, inherently stingy, or unpatriotic. In antisemitic caricatures, Jews are often depicted as grotesque, with big noses and associated with wealth. Examples of antisemitic deeds are: assaulting someone because she or he is Jewish, attacking a synagogue, daubing swastikas on Jewish graves, or refusing to hire or promote people because they are Jewish.

4. Antisemitism can be direct or indirect, explicit or coded. For example, "the Rothschilds control the world" is a coded statement about the alleged power of "the Jews" over banks and international finance. Similarly, portraying Israel as the ultimate evil or grossly exaggerating its actual influence can be a coded way of racializing and stigmatizing Jews. In many cases, identifying coded speech is a matter of context and judgement, taking account of these guidelines.

5. Denying or minimizing the Holocaust by claiming that the deliberate Nazi genocide of the Jews did not take place, or that there were no extermination camps or gas chambers, or that the number of victims was a fraction of the actual total, is antisemitic.

B. Israel and Palestine: examples that, on the face of it, are antisemitic

6. Applying the symbols, images, and negative stereotypes of classical antisemitism (see guidelines 2 and 3) to the State of Israel.

7. Holding Jews collectively responsible for Israel's conduct or treating Jews, simply because they are Jewish, as agents of Israel.

8. Requiring people, because they are Jewish, publicly to condemn Israel or Zionism (for example, at a political meeting).

9. Assuming that non-Israeli Jews, simply because they are Jews, are necessarily more loyal to Israel than to their own countries.

10. Denying the right of Jews in the State of Israel to exist and flourish, collectively and individually, as Jews, in accordance with the principle of equality.

C. Israel and Palestine: examples that, on the face of it, are not antisemitic

(whether or not one approves of the view or action)

11. Supporting the Palestinian demand for justice and the full grant of their political, national, civil, and human rights, as encapsulated in international law.

12. Criticizing or opposing Zionism as a form of nationalism, or arguing for a variety of constitutional arrangements for Jews and Palestinians in the area between the Jordan River and the Mediterranean. It is not antisemitic to support arrangements that accord full equality to all inhabitants "between the river and the sea", whether in two states, a binational state, unitary democratic state, federal state, or in whatever form.

13. Evidence-based criticism of Israel as a state. This includes its institutions and founding principles. It also includes its policies and practices, domestic and abroad, such as the conduct of Israel in the West Bank and Gaza, the role Israel plays in the region, or any other way in which, as a state, it influences events in the world. It is not antisemitic to point out systematic racial discrimination. In general, the same norms of debate that apply to other states and to other conflicts over national self-determination apply in the case of Israel and Palestine. Thus, even if contentious, it is not antisemitic, in and of itself, to compare Israel with other historical cases, including settler-colonialism or apartheid.

14. Boycott, divestment, and sanctions are commonplace, non-violent forms of political protest against states. In the Israeli case they are not, in and of themselves, antisemitic.

15. Political speech does not have to be measured, proportional, tempered, or reasonable to be protected under article 19 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights or article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights and other human rights instruments. Criticism that some may see as excessive or contentious, or as reflecting a "double standard", is not, in and of itself, antisemitic. In general, the line between antisemitic and non-antisemitic speech is different from the line between unreasonable and reasonable speech.

are to live in the material world in which we find ourselves, how are we to extract from the world what it is that we need and want, what it is that both protects us and enables us to excel ourselves and become more. The more resources architecture develops – both practical and theoretical – the more it is able to address this abiding problem.

Though Deleuze doesn't have a theory of space as such, I want to use some of his work to think about questions of spatial inhabitation. I can only do so indirectly by creating a more systematic and coherent conception than is found in his own writings, and without simply "applying" it directly to architecture (a process that can only do injustice to the richness of his concepts as well as to the inventiveness of architecture itself), where an idea of Deleuze's may help infiltrate into and inflect rather than directly affect architectural discourse and practice.

2. Theory and the Problem

For Deleuze, theory, or more precisely, philosophy, is not a mode of reflection but a mode of production. Knowledges, theories are composed of *concepts*, and concepts are always and only occasioned by *problems*. Philosophy is the domain for the production of concepts, especially new concepts. It is the creation, fabrication, or invention of what has not been conceptualized before. Philosophy does not develop concepts that it finds. The only way to know concepts is to make them, which is one of the most difficult of all tasks. For this reason Deleuze and Félix Guattari (I will use their works interchangeably) regard the philosopher as "the concept's friend; he is the potentiality of the concept."[1] Philosophy is the condition for the creation of concepts, and the creation of concepts is not simply the creation of ideas to contemplate, reflect on, or communicate, but rather, the production of something that has a quasi-autonomous existence, a life of its own, that performs its own work. "The concept posits itself to the same extent that it is created."[2] Though the concept is an invention, something new, it can be dated (and hence can be marked by a proper name: "Plato's ideas," "Kant's transcendental," "Hegel's dialectic," and so on); what makes it a concept as opposed to an obsession or a fantasy is its existence independent of its origin, autonomous from its creator, its capacity to take on a life of its own. A concept is capable of detaching itself from its original formulation and working elsewhere. To be a concept it must both originate somewhere, not out of nothing but at some moment out of some preexisting elements; and it must be

1. Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, *What is Philosophy?* trans. Hugh Tomlinson and Graham Burchell (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994), 5.
2. Ibid., 11.

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capable of sustaining itself elsewhere, in the life of other concepts and its plane of immanence. This is the future of the concept, if it has one at all. The life of the concept is not usually stable, but, as Nietzsche recognized, is constituted out of the changing forces that have seized hold of it, used it, transformed it, mutated or revived it. A concept lives only when it is put to work, made to do something – develop an argument, inspire an artwork, generate discussion and analysis, produce effects.

The concept is what philosophy uses to think and to create. Deleuze and Guattari make clear that philosophy, as the domain for the production of concepts, is only *one* arena for creation and thinking. Science and art express two quite other relations invested in creation and thinking that bypass the concept, seeking in preference the functive, the percept, or the affect that philosophy cannot supplant, judge, reflect on, or correct but works alongside and connects with. What distinguishes philosophy from art and science, what particularizes it, is not that it is concerned with thinking – this is true of all production – but that the kind of thinking that it does is composed of concepts, and concepts themselves are always and only occasioned by problems, which themselves are inherent in or raised as such by events, the implacable force of the outside that, because it is outside, generates problems that we cannot help but address. Concepts are, for Deleuze, never unitary or singular but always composite, a multiplicity, an uneven and unblended concatenation of disparate elements which function to produce effects, other concepts, other actions and practices: "There is no concept with only one component."[3]

3. Ibid., 15.

Concepts are points of multiplicity, connections of components, which share borders with other concepts, are marked by irregular contours, and have an improper or imperfect fit. This is why, although they attain a certain cohesion, they cannot align to form systems. It is propositions, statements, claims, that is, discourses, that form systems through their orderly arrangement, their commitments to uniformity and coherence. Propositions function in a relation of representation, of correspondence, and qualify for claims of truth and validity. Arguments can only be made using propositions. Where propositions form systems, concepts emerge from and link to *events*. Events are always specific, historical singularities, "hecceities," which do not form systems or patterns but induce intensities, functioning as modes of affection and speeds of variation. Events are nonrecurrent, unrepeatable, and uncontainable. They occasion responses rather than

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statements, and some of the responses they generate may involve the production of concepts. One of Deleuze's great strengths is his linkage of the production of theory to the occasion of events rather than to the provocations of the mind. Theory, concepts, as much as the practical activities of art and science, are incited, generated, put under pressure, and evaluated by the force of problems produced by events.

The problem poses itself as a question which the concept, among other things, attempts to address. The concept never answers or solves the problem; it transforms it, replaces it with other problems. Problems do not engender solutions but induce action and thus experimentation. Events are always problematic, they always induce problems, insofar as events are the disparate and unrepeatable alignment of points that come together provisionally, raising at the very least the question of their nature, their existence, their provisionality, their force, and their speed. Concepts are one mode of attempted "solution," a solution not of the problem but *in its vicinity*. Concepts are the performance of the problem rather than the enactment of their solution.

In turn, it is thought that generates the problem out of the event and produces thought itself, and its products, concepts, as event. This may explain why one of Deleuze's most striking preoccupations is the separation of well-formed, legitimate questions or problems and how they can be distinguished from badly formed ones.[4] A badly formulated question, a false problem, can generate only illusions as its "solutions," or perhaps the illusion *of* a solution. These misformulations of the problem preempt or foreclose the experiments, the inventions, necessary for the development of a solution; they pose the question as already resolvable in given terms: "Far from being concerned with solutions, truth and falsehood primarily affect problems. A solution always has the truth it deserves according to the problem to which it is a response, and the problem always has the solution it deserves in proportion to *its own* truth or falsity."[5]

3. The Problem of Space

Space, how to occupy it, how to live in it, how to manage or regulate objects within it, and to organize our proximity to those objects, remains one of the necessary questions or problems that press on all social and cultural life. Space and time, within and by means of which objects, subjects, and their relations are structured and positioned, remain irreducible problems, renewed for each location and generation, whose "solution" can never be definitive, but is always in a

4. See Gilles Deleuze, *Bergsonism*, trans. Hugh Tomlinson and Barbara Habberjam (New York: Zone Books, 1988).
5. See Gilles Deleuze, *Difference and Repetition*, trans. Paul Patton (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994), 158-59.

state of transformation or renegotiation.

Deleuze focuses through all of his writings on the broad questions of ontology, on the ways in which time, as a mode of qualitative intensity, and space, as the form of all quantitative extensivity, can be theorized in terms other than those which have structured and divided them into the mutually exclusive disciplines in either the sciences or the humanities. He is interested in a conception of space (and time) which is, on the one hand, above the level of constraint or analysis of the hard sciences, for whom the mathematization of results is of central concern; and yet below the level of freedom of the arts, a kind of space generated by technicity, by the discovery of practical methods of ordering and structuring that do not guarantee their results (as science does) but nevertheless generate powerful effects, produce social and cultural changes (as the arts do).

I will focus only on one strand of Deleuze's conception of space, a small series of terms he links together. His work abounds in references to spatiality, though they do not take the form of a cohesive or developed argument: his discussion of two types of spatial organization (smooth and striated, that is, ordered through nomadic and State apparatus forms respectively),[6] which is the equivalent of his discussion of two types of multiplicity (intensive and extensive, magnitudinal and numerical orders), which is the equivalent of his discussion of the Bergsonian distinction between space and duration (mathematical and intuitive, solid and fluid, material objects and living beings, the actual and the virtual). This series of linkages is immensely complicated; I only want to outline some broad suggestions and questions he raises.

In his book *Bergsonism*, Deleuze presents a careful discussion of Bergson's distinction between space (and the mathematization or quantification of objects through its geometrical mapping) and duration (which, as qualitative, is amenable to mathematization but is dramatically transformed in the process). Space solicits perception, and perception's function is to outline objects, to simplify them in order to facilitate imminent action, to highlight what it is in the object that interests us. Science functions to solidify and consolidate perception's practical orientation: its goal is to generate repeatable actions whose results, if not controlled, can at least be predicted through the control of variables. This is not a shortcoming of science but its goal: not a knowledge of objects in their infinite richness and permeability with other objects, but with that which is extractable from objects. Science, perception, objects, and space are fundamentally

6. Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, *A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia*, trans. Brian Massumi (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1987).

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aligned: they are all on the side of, the tools for, the facilitation of practical action, and ultimately of habitual, guaranteed behavior. This means that each eludes the reality of the interconnection of all objects with all others in order to seek instead the outline or simplification of objects. Science has never been concerned with the reality of its objects of investigation, only with outlinable objects whose contextual variants can be explored in controlled, that is, repeatable, conditions. Which means, for Bergson, that science has never been able to grasp the reality of time itself, duration, and consequently the significance that temporal becoming has for undoing the categories and controls relevant to space. Science continually, and necessarily, reduces duration to spatialization, which it does whenever time is counted, represented as a line, a circle, a spiral, that is, when it is presented as an even, homogenous continuum, readily divisible into self-identical instants.

Bergson attributes to space the qualities of the actual: divisibility, homogeneity, infinite extensibility, geometrical modeling, and, above all, the capacity to be reborn anew at every minute: the irrelevance of the future for any understanding of the spatial functioning of objects, which are entirely structured by the causal networks of the present (or equally, the past). If space and the objects locatable in space are of the order of the actual, then by contrast, Bergson ascribes to duration the qualities of the virtual – of latency, surprise, continuity, interconnection – the very qualities that science is unable to grasp, those qualities that make up events, singularities, unpredictable eruptions, transmutations, or evolutions, phenomena that invariably mark life, if not also matter and objects. The virtual is the inherence or subsistence of the past in the present, and the supervening of the future to overwrite the present's access to the past. It is the capacity to diverge from the present, to function differently, that is thus antipredictive, or rather, fundamentally historical or retrospective.

Deleuze remains fascinated by and committed to Bergsonism all through his writings. It guides his (and Guattari's) division of space into smooth and striated modalities in *A Thousand Plateaus*; it directs much of his analysis of the time-image in *Cinema 2*; and it returns in his final collaborative writings with Guattari, in *What is Philosophy?*, their discussion of science, art, philosophy, and their relations to the "chaoid" states of a deterritorialized and unpredictable earth. Basically, and to be quite reductive, what Deleuze remains fascinated by in this 30-year romance with Bergsonism, and with the concept of the virtual that Bergson develops at the

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It is clear that something is important here other than oral excitement and satisfaction, although this may be the basis of everything else. Many other important things can be studied, and they include:

1. The nature of the object.
2. The infant's capacity to recognize the object as 'not-me'.
3. The place of the object – outside, inside, at the border.
4. The infant's capacity to create, think up, devise, originate, produce an object.
5. The initiation of an affectionate type of object-relationship.

I have introduced the terms 'transitional objects' and 'transitional phenomena' for designation of the intermediate area of experience, between the thumb and the teddy bear, between the oral erotism and the true object-relationship, between primary creative activity and the projection of what has already been introjected, between primary unawareness of indebtedness and the acknowledgement of indebtedness ('Say: "ta"').

By this definition an infant's babbling and the way in which an older child goes over a repertory of songs and tunes while preparing for sleep come within the intermediate area as transitional phenomena, along with the use made of objects that are not part of the infant's body yet are not fully recognized as belonging to external reality.

Inadequacy of Usual Statement of Human Nature
It is generally acknowledged that a statement of human nature in terms of interpersonal relationships is not good enough even when the imaginative elaboration of function and the whole of fantasy both conscious and unconscious, including the repressed unconscious, are allowed for. There is another way of describing persons that comes out of the researches of the past two decades. Of every individual who has reached to the stage of being a unit with a limiting membrane and an outside and an-inside, it can be said that there is an *inner reality* to that individual, an inner world that can be rich or poor and can be at peace or in a state of war. This helps, but is it enough?

My claim is that if there is a need for this double statement, there is also need for a triple one: the third part of the life of a human being, a part that we cannot ignore, is an intermediate area of *experiencing*, to which inner reality and external life both contribute. It is an area that is not challenged, because no claim is made on its behalf except that it shall exist as a resting-place for the individual engaged in the perpetual human task of keeping inner and outer reality separate yet interrelated.

It is usual to refer to 'reality-testing', and to make a clear distinction between apperception and perception. I am here staking a claim for an intermediate state between a baby's inability and his growing ability to recognize and accept reality. I am therefore studying the substance of *illusion*, that which is allowed to the infant, and which in adult life is inherent in art and religion, and yet becomes the hallmark of madness when an adult puts too powerful a claim on the credulity of others, forcing them to acknowledge a sharing of illusion that is not their own. We can share a respect for *illusory experience*, and if we wish we may collect together and form a group on the basis of the similarity of our illusory experiences. This is a natural root of grouping among human beings.

I hope it will be understood that I am not referring exactly to the little child's teddy bear or to the infant's first use of the fist (thumb, fingers). I am not specifically studying the first object of object-relationships. I am concerned with the first possession, and with the intermediate area between the subjective and that which is objectively perceived.

Development of a Personal Pattern
There is plenty of reference in psychoanalytic literature to the progress from 'hand to mouth' to 'hand to genital', but perhaps less to further progress to the handling of truly 'not-me' objects. Sooner or later in an infant's development there comes a tendency on the part of the infant to weave other-than-me objects into the personal pattern. To some extent these objects stand for the breast, but it is not especially this point that is under discussion.

In the case of some infants the thumb is placed in the mouth while fingers are made to caress the face by pronation and supination movements of the forearm. The mouth is then active in relation to the thumb, but not in relation to the fingers. The fingers caressing the upper lip, or some other part, may be or may become more important than the thumb engaging the mouth. Moreover, this caressing activity may be found alone, without the more direct thumb-mouth union.

In common experience one of the following occurs, complicating an auto-erotic experience such as thumb-sucking:

(i) with the other hand the baby takes an external object, say a part of a sheet or blanket, into the mouth along with the fingers; or

(ii) somehow or other the bit of cloth is held and sucked, or not actually sucked; the objects used naturally include napkins and

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(later) handkerchiefs, and this depends on what is readily and reliably available; or

(iii) the baby starts from early months to pluck wool and to collect it and to use it for the caressing part of the activity; less commonly, the wool is swallowed, even causing trouble; or

(iv) mouthing occurs, accompanied by sounds of 'mum-mum', babbling, anal noises, the first musical notes, and so on.

One may suppose that thinking, or fantasying, gets linked up with these functional experiences.

All these things I am calling *transitional phenomena*. Also, out of all this (if we study any one infant) there may emerge some thing or some phenomenon – perhaps a bundle of wool or the corner of a blanket or eiderdown, or a word or tune, or a mannerism – that becomes vitally important to the infant for use at the time of going to sleep, and is a defence against anxiety, especially anxiety of depressive type. Perhaps some soft object or other type of object has been found and used by the infant, and this then becomes what I am calling a *transitional object*. This object goes on being important. The parents get to know its value and carry it round when travelling. The mother lets it get dirty and even smelly, knowing that by washing it she introduces a break in continuity in the infant's experience, a break that may destroy the meaning and value of the object to the infant.

I suggest that the pattern of transitional phenomena begins to show at about four to six to eight to twelve months. Purposely I leave room for wide variations.

Patterns set in infancy may persist into childhood, so that the original soft object continues to be absolutely necessary at bed-time or at time of loneliness or when a depressed mood threatens. In health, however, there is a gradual extension of range of interest, and eventually the extended range is maintained, even when depressive anxiety is near. A need for a specific object or a behaviour pattern that started at a very early date may reappear at a later age when deprivation threatens.

This first possession is used in conjunction with special techniques derived from very early infancy, which can include or exist apart from the more direct auto-erotic activities. Gradually in the life of an infant teddies and dolls and hard toys are acquired. Boys to some extent tend to go over to use hard objects, whereas girls tend to proceed right ahead to the acquisition of a family. It is important to note, however, that *there is no noticeable difference between boy and girl in their use of the original 'not-me' possession*, which I am calling the transitional object.

As the infant starts to use organized sounds ('mum', 'ta', 'da') there may appear a 'word' for the transitional object. The name given by the infant to these earliest objects is often significant, and it usually has a word used by the adults partly incorporated in it. For instance, 'baa' may be the name, and the 'b' may have come from the adult's use of the word 'baby' or 'bear'.

I should mention that sometimes there is no transitional object except the mother herself. Or an infant may be so disturbed in emotional development that the transition state cannot be enjoyed, or the sequence of objects used is broken. The sequence may nevertheless be maintained in a hidden way.

Summary of Special Qualities in the Relationship

1. The infant assumes rights over the object, and we agree to this assumption. Nevertheless, some abrogation of omnipotence is a feature from the start.

2. The object is affectionately cuddled as well as excitedly loved and mutilated.

3. It must never change, unless changed by the infant.

4. It must survive instinctual loving, and also hating and, if it be a feature, pure aggression.

5. Yet it must seem to the infant to give warmth, or to move, or to have texture, or to do something that seems to show it has vitality or reality of its own.

6. It comes from without from our point of view, but not so from the point of view of the baby. Neither does it come from within; it is not a hallucination.

7. Its fate is to be gradually allowed to be decathected, so that in the course of years it becomes not so much forgotten as relegated to limbo. By this I mean that in health the transitional object does not 'go inside' nor does the feeling about it necessarily undergo repression. It is not forgotten and it is not mourned. It loses meaning, and this is because the transitional phenomena have become diffused, have become spread out over the whole intermediate territory between 'inner psychic reality' and 'the external world as perceived by two persons in common', that is to say, over the whole cultural field.

At this point my subject widens out into that of play, and of artistic creativity and appreciation, and of religious feeling, and of dreaming, and also of fetishism, lying and stealing, the origin and loss of affectionate feeling, drug addiction, the talisman of obsessional rituals, etc.

Relationship of the Transitional Object to Symbolism

It is true that the piece of blanket (or whatever it is) is symbolical of some part-object, such as the breast. Nevertheless, the point of it is not its symbolic value so much as its actuality. Its not being the breast (or the mother), although real, is as important as the fact that it stands for the breast (or mother).

When symbolism is employed the infant is already clearly distinguishing between fantasy and fact, between inner objects and external objects, between primary creativity and perception. But the term transitional object, according to my suggestion, gives room for the process of becoming able to accept difference and similarity. I think there is use for a term for the root of symbolism in time, a term that describes the infant's journey from the purely subjective to objectivity; and it seems to me that the transitional object (piece of blanket, etc.) is what we see of this journey of progress towards experiencing.

It would be possible to understand the transitional object while not fully understanding the nature of symbolism. It seems that symbolism can be properly studied only in the process of the growth of an individual and that it has at the very best a variable meaning. For instance, if we consider the wafer of the Blessed Sacrament, which is symbolic of the body of Christ, I think I am right in saying that for the Roman Catholic community it *is* the body, and for the Protestant community it is a *substitute,* a reminder, and is essentially not, in fact, actually the body itself. Yet in both cases it is a symbol.

CLINICAL DESCRIPTION OF A TRANSITIONAL OBJECT

For anyone in touch with parents and children, there is an infinite quantity and variety of illustrative clinical material. The following illustrations are given merely to remind readers of similar material in their own experiences.

Two Brothers: Contrast in Early Use of Possessions

Distortion in use of transitional object. X, now a healthy man, has had to fight his way towards maturity. The mother 'learned how to be a mother' in her management of X when he was an infant and she was able to avoid certain mistakes with the other children because of what she learned with him. There were also external reasons why she was anxious at the time of her rather lonely management of X when he was born. She took her job as a mother very seriously and she breast-fed X for seven months. She feels that in his case this was

too long and he was very difficult to wean. He never sucked his thumb or his fingers and when she weaned him 'he had nothing to fall back on'. He had never had the bottle or a dummy or any other form of feeding. He had a very strong and early *attachment to her herself,* as a person, and it was her actual person that he needed.

From twelve months he adopted a rabbit which he would cuddle, and his affectionate regard for the rabbit eventually transferred to real rabbits. This particular rabbit lasted till he was five or six years old. It could be described as a *comforter,* but it never had the true quality of a transitional object. It was never, as a true transitional object would have been, more important than the mother, an almost inseparable part of the infant. In the case of this particular boy the kinds of anxiety that were brought to a head by the weaning at seven months later produced asthma, and only gradually did he conquer this. It was important for him that he found employment far away from the home town. His attachment to his mother is still very powerful, although he comes within the wide definition of the term normal, or healthy. This man has not married.

Typical use of transitional object. X's younger brother, Y, has developed in quite a straightforward way throughout. He now has three healthy children of his own. He was fed at the breast for four months and then weaned without difficulty. Y sucked his thumb in the early weeks and this again 'made weaning easier for him than for his older brother'. Soon after weaning at five to six months he adopted the end of the blanket where the stitching finished. He was pleased if a little bit of the wool stuck out at the corner and with this he would tickle his nose. This very early became his 'Baa'; he invented this word for it himself as soon as he could use organized sounds. From the time when he was about a year old he was able to substitute for the end of the blanket a soft green jersey with a red tie. This was not a 'comforter' as in the case of the depressive older brother, but a 'soother'. It was a sedative which always worked. This is a typical example of what I am calling a *transitional object.* When Y was a little boy it was always certain that if anyone gave him his 'Baa' he would immediately suck it and lose anxiety, and in fact he would go to sleep within a few minutes if the time for sleep were at all near. The thumb-sucking continued at the same time, lasting until he was three or four years old, and he remembers thumb-sucking and a hard place on one thumb which resulted from it. He is now interested (as a father) in the thumb-sucking of his children and their use of 'Baas'.

The story of seven ordinary children in this family brings out the following points, arranged for comparison in the table below:

		Thumb	Transitional Object		Type of Child
X	Boy	0	Mother	Rabbit (comforter)	Mother-fixated
Y	Boy	+	'Baa'	Jersey (soother)	Free
Twins	Girl	0	Dummy	Donkey (friend)	Late maturity
	Boy	0	'Ee'	Ee (protective)	Latent psychopathic
Children of Y	Girl	0	'Baa'	Blanket (reassurance)	Developing well
	Girl	+	Thumb	Thumb (satisfaction)	Developing well
	Boy	+	'Mimis'	Objects (sorting)[1]	Developing well

[1] Added note: This was not clear, but I have left it as it was. D.W.W., 1971.

Value in History-taking

In consultation with a parent it is often valuable to get information about the early techniques and possessions of all the children of the family. This starts the mother off on a comparison of her children one with another, and enables her to remember and compare their characteristics at an early age.

The Child's Contribution

Information can often be obtained from a child in regard to transitional objects. For instance:

Angus (eleven years nine months) told me that his brother 'has tons of teddies and things' and 'before that he had little bears', and he followed this up with a talk about his own history. He said he never had teddies. There was a bell rope that hung down, a tag end of which he would go on hitting, and so go off to sleep. Probably in the end it fell, and that was the end of it. There was, however, something else. He was very shy about this. It was a purple rabbit with red eyes. 'I wasn't fond of it. I used to throw it around. Jeremy has it now, I gave it to him. I gave it to Jeremy because it was naughty. It *would* fall off the chest of drawers. *It still visits me. I like it to visit me.*' He surprised himself when he drew the purple rabbit.

It will be noted that this eleven-year-old boy with the ordinary good reality-sense of his age spoke as if lacking in reality-sense when describing the transitional object's qualities and activities. When I saw the mother later she expressed surprise that Angus remembered the purple rabbit. She easily recognized it from the coloured drawing.

Ready Availability of Examples

I deliberately refrain from giving more case-material here, particularly as I wish to avoid giving the impression that what I am reporting is rare. In practically every case-history there is something to be found that is interesting in the transitional phenomena, or in their absence.

THEORETICAL STUDY

There are certain comments that can be made on the basis of accepted psychoanalytic theory:

1. The transitional object stands for the breast, or the object of the first relationship.

2. The transitional object antedates established reality-testing.

3. In relation to the transitional object the infant passes from (magical) omnipotent control to control by manipulation (involving muscle erotism and coordination pleasure).

4. The transitional object may eventually develop into a fetish object and so persist as a characteristic of the adult sexual life. (See Wulff's (1946) development of the theme.)

5. The transitional object may, because of anal erotic organization, stand for faeces (but it is not for this reason that it may become smelly and remain unwashed).

Relationship to Internal Object (Klein)

It is interesting to compare the transitional object concept with Melanie Klein's (1934) concept of the internal object. The transitional object is *not an internal object* (which is a mental concept) – it is a possession. Yet it is not (for the infant) an external object either.

The following complex statement has to be made. The infant can employ a transitional object when the internal object is alive and real and good enough (not too persecutory). But this internal object depends for its qualities on the existence and aliveness and behaviour of the external object. Failure of the latter in some essential function indirectly leads to deadness or to a persecutory quality of the internal

object.[1] After a persistence of inadequacy of the external object the internal object fails to have meaning to the infant, and then, and then only, does the transitional object become meaningless too. The transitional object may therefore stand for the 'external' breast, but *indirectly*, through standing for an 'internal' breast.

The transitional object is never under magical control like the internal object, nor is it outside control as the real mother is.

Illusion-Disillusionment

In order to prepare the ground for my own positive contribution to this subject I must put into words some of the things that I think are taken too easily for granted in many psychoanalytic writings on infantile emotional development, although they may be understood in practice.

There is no possibility whatever for an infant to proceed from the pleasure principle to the reality principle or towards and beyond primary identification (see Freud, 1923), unless there is a good-enough mother. The good-enough 'mother' (not necessarily the infant's own mother) is one who makes active adaptation to the infant's needs, an active adaptation that gradually lessens, according to the infant's growing ability to account for failure of adaptation and to tolerate the results of frustration. Naturally, the infant's own mother is more likely to be good enough than some other person, since this active adaptation demands an easy and unresented preoccupation with the one infant; in fact, success in infant care depends on the fact of devotion, not on cleverness or intellectual enlightenment.

The good-enough mother, as I have stated, starts off with an almost complete adaptation to her infant's needs, and as time proceeds she adapts less and less completely, gradually, according to the infant's growing ability to deal with her failure.

The infant's means of dealing with this maternal failure include the following:

1. The infant's experience, often repeated, that there is a time-limit to frustration. At first, naturally, this time-limit must be short.

2. Growing sense of process.

3. The beginnings of mental activity.

4. Employment of auto-erotic satisfactions.

5. Remembering, reliving, fantasying, dreaming; the integrating of past, present, and future.

[1] Text modified here, though based on the original statement.

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If all goes well the infant can actually come to gain from the experience of frustration, since incomplete adaptation to need makes objects real, that is to say hated as well as loved. The consequence of this is that *if all goes well* the infant can be disturbed by a close adaptation to need that is continued too long, not allowed its natural decrease, since exact adaptation resembles magic and the object that behaves perfectly becomes no better than a hallucination. Nevertheless, *at the start* adaptation needs to be almost exact, and unless this is so it is not possible for the infant to begin to develop a capacity to experience a relationship to external reality, or even to form a conception of external reality.

Illusion and the Value of Illusion

The mother, at the beginning, by an almost 100 per cent adaptation affords the infant the opportunity for the *illusion* that her breast is part of the infant. It is, as it were, under the baby's magical control. The same can be said in terms of infant care in general, in the quiet times between excitements. Omnipotence is nearly a fact of experience. The mother's eventual task is gradually to disillusion the infant, but she has no hope of success unless at first she has been able to give sufficient opportunity for illusion.

In another language, the breast is created by the infant over and over again out of the infant's capacity to love or (one can say) out of need. A subjective phenomenon develops in the baby, which we call the mother's breast.[1] The mother places the actual breast just there where the infant is ready to create, and at the right moment.

From birth, therefore, the human being is concerned with the problem of the relationship between what is objectively perceived and what is subjectively conceived of, and in the solution of this problem there is no health for the human being who has not been started off well enough by the mother. *The intermediate area to which I am referring is the area that is allowed to the infant between primary creativity and objective perception based on reality-testing.* The transitional phenomena represent the early stages of the use of illusion, without which there is no meaning for the human being in the idea of a relationship with an object that is perceived by others as external to that being.

The idea illustrated in *Figure 1* is this: that at some theoretical point early in the development of every human individual an infant in a

[1] I include the whole technique of mothering. When it is said that the first object is the breast, the word 'breast' is used, I believe, to stand for the technique of mothering as well as for the actual flesh. It is not impossible for a mother to be a good-enough mother (in my way of putting it) with a bottle for the actual feeding.

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certain setting provided by the mother is capable of conceiving of the idea of something that would meet the growing need that arises out of instinctual tension. The infant cannot be said to know at first what is to be created. At this point in time the mother presents herself. In the ordinary way she gives her breast and her potential feeding urge. The mother's adaptation to the infant's needs, when good enough, gives the infant the *illusion* that there is an external reality that corresponds to the infant's own capacity to create. In other words, there is an overlap between what the mother supplies and what the child might conceive of. To the observer, the child perceives what the mother actually presents, but this is not the whole truth. The infant perceives the breast only in so far as a breast could be created just there and then. There is no interchange between the mother and the infant. Psychologically the infant takes from a breast that is part of the infant, and the mother gives milk to an infant that is part of herself. In psychology, the idea of interchange is based on an illusion in the psychologist.

In *Figure 2* a shape is given to the area of illusion, to illustrate what I consider to be the main function of the transitional object and of transitional phenomena. The transitional object and the transitional phenomena start each human being off with what will always be important for them, i.e. a neutral area of experience which will not be challenged. *Of the transitional object it can be said that it is a matter of agreement between us and the baby that we will never ask the question: 'Did you conceive of this or was it presented to you from without?' The important point is that no decision on this point is expected. The question is not to be formulated.*

Figure 1

Figure 2

This problem, which undoubtedly concerns the human infant in an hidden way at the beginning, gradually becomes an obvious problem on account of the fact that the mother's main task (next to providing opportunity for illusion) is disillusionment. This is preliminary to the task of weaning, and it also continues as one of the tasks of parents and educators. In other words, this matter of *illusion* is one that belongs inherently to human beings and that no individual finally solves for himself or herself, although a *theoretical* understanding of it may provide a *theoretical* solution. If things go well, in this gradual disillusionment process, the stage is set for the frustrations that we gather together under the word weaning; but it should be remembered that when we talk about the phenomena (which Klein (1940) has specifically illuminated in her concept of the depressive position) that cluster round weaning we are assuming the underlying process, the process by which opportunity for illusion and gradual disillusionment is provided. If illusion-disillusionment has gone astray the infant cannot get to so normal a thing as weaning, nor to a reaction to weaning, and it is then absurd to refer to weaning at all. The mere termination of breast-feeding is not a weaning.

We can see the tremendous significance of weaning in the case of the normal child. When we witness the complex reaction that is set going in a certain child by the weaning process, we know that this is able to take place in that child because the illusion-disillusionment process is being carried through so well that we can ignore it while discussing actual weaning.

Development of the Theory of Illusion-Disillusionment
It is assumed here that the task of reality-acceptance is never completed, that no human being is free from the strain of relating inner and outer reality, and that relief from this strain is provided by an intermediate area of experience (cf. Riviere, 1936) which is not challenged (arts, religion, etc.). This intermediate area is in direct continuity with the play area of the small child who is 'lost' in play.

In infancy this intermediate area is necessary for the initiation of a relationship between the child and the world, and is made possible by good-enough mothering at the early critical phase. Essential to all this is continuity (in time) of the external emotional environment and of particular elements in the physical environment such as the transitional object or objects.

The transitional phenomena are allowable to the infant because of the parents' intuitive recognition of the strain inherent in objective

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When the living rot on the bodies of the dead
When the combatants' teeth become knives
When words lose their meaning and become arsenic
When the aggressors' nails become claws
When old friends hurry to join the carnage
When the victors' eyes become live shells
When clergymen pick up the hammer and crucify
When officials open the door to the enemy
When the mountain peoples' feet weigh like elephants
When roses grow only in cemeteries
When they eat the Palestinian's liver before he's even dead
When the sun itself has no other purpose than being a shroud

the human tide moves on . . . .

Figure 1. Richard Serra, *Tilted Arc,* 1981. Corten steel, 12 x 120 feet. Copyright 1999 Richard Serra/Artists Rights Society (ARS), New York. Courtesy of Gagosian Gallery.

institutional critique and earthworks, revising the assumptions implicit in this model to reflect upon the globalized, multicultural ambience of the present day? How do we assess this work within a broader field of activity that explores institutional frameworks and locations? The present discussion will pursue these questions.

The primary distinction I wish to make concerns two notions of site: a *literal* site and a *functional* site. The literal site is, as Joseph Kosuth would say, in situ; it is an actual location, a singular place.[1] The artist's intervention conforms to the physical constraints of this situation, even if (or precisely when) it would subject this to critique. The work's formal outcome is thus determined by a physical place, by an understanding of the place as actual. Reflecting a perception of the site as unique, the work is itself "unique." It is thus a kind of monument, a public work commissioned *for* the site. The civic sculptures of Richard Serra exemplify this approach. As Serra has observed, "The specificity of site-oriented works means that they are conceived for, dependent upon, and inseparable from their location."[2] In the case of *Tilted Arc,* we have, in place of a traditional monument (a memorial to an event or person) or the decorative monument of late modernism (the Calder dominating a corporate plaza), a critical monument with claims to resistance. Inextricable from its location in Federal Plaza, a setting it overwhelmed, Serra's sculpture imbued the premise of site specificity with a newfound monumentality. Serra was "making a permanent work" for "a specific

place."[3] Reversing the terms of his early splashings and pourings, which thematized their transience through a motivation of process,[4] *Tilted Arc* was designed to stand in Federal Plaza in perpetuity, much like the neoclassical courthouse it faced. It sought to counter Federal Plaza's symbology of transcendent order with a real-time bodily experience of the literal site.

In contrast, the functional site may or may not incorporate a physical place. It certainly does not *privilege* this place. Instead, it is a process, an operation occurring between sites, a mapping of institutional and textual filiations and the bodies that move between them (the artist's above all). It is as an informational site, a palimpsest of text, photographs and video recordings, physical places, and things: an allegorical site, to recall Craig Owens's term, aptly coined to describe Robert Smithson's polymathic enterprise, whose vectored and discursive notion of "place" opposes Serra's phenomenological model.[5] It is no longer an obdurate steel wall, attached to the plaza for eternity. On the contrary, the functional work refuses the intransigence of literal site specificity. It is a temporary thing, a movement, a chain of meanings and imbricated histories: a place marked and swiftly abandoned. The mobile site thus courts its destruction; it is willfully temporary; its nature is not to endure but to *come down.*

Certainly, earlier institutional critique did much to expose the functional or informational character of the gallery and museum.[6] In this sense, artists like Dion, Müller, Green, Fraser, and Burr have merely developed the inquiry introduced in the work of Hans Haacke, Marcel Broodthaers, Daniel Buren, Mel Bochner, and Michael Asher, which displaced the phenomenological site of the minimalist installation into a critical reflection on the gallery itself.[7] However, these activities were, for the most part, site specific; the force of their critiques was due, in part, to their confinement to a particular place.[8] What were the benefits of this literal orientation? To begin with, site specificity was understood, in its very constitution, as a mode of refusal of the system of art's commodification. Locating its critique within the gallery or museum, the site-specific work exposed this space as a material entity, a no longer neutral place, a backdrop for the merchandising of portable art objects. For, as Douglas Crimp argued, the modern museum developed in concert with the production and consumption of "homeless" works of art, whose aesthetic and commercial value it affirmed. It was claimed that site specificity would impede this process:

> The idealism of modern art, in which the art object *in and of itself* was seen to have a fixed and transhistorical meaning, determined the object's placelessness, its belonging to no particular place, a no-place that was in reality the museum—the actual museum and the museum as a representation of the institutional system of circulation that also comprises the artist's studio, the commercial gallery, the collector's home. . . . Site specificity opposed that idealism—and unveiled the material system it obscured—by its refusal of circulatory mobility, its belongingness to a *specific* site.[9]

Twenty-five years after the first installations of Buren, Haacke, and Asher, we might begin to question the efficacy of such claims (the valorization of site specificity by its

postmodernist supporters has yet to occasion a critical reply):[10] to what extent site specificity accomplished the desired disruption of the commodity system through its vaunted "refusal of circulatory mobility," and moreover whether a practice grounded in a materialist analysis alone remains practicable or even desirable today. But let us first consider another claim made on behalf of site specificity, which concerned the viewer. Deferring attention from the portable modernist work to the gallery, the site-specific installation was said to render one conscious of one's body existing within this ambience. The body of site specificity was a physicalized body, aware of its surroundings, a body of heightened critical acuity. The viewer of the modernist work, in contrast, was purportedly blind to its ideological nature.[11] Thus the premise of site specificity to locate the work in a single place, *and only there,* bespoke the 1960s call for Presence, the demand for the experience of "being there." An underlying topos of Merleau-Ponty's phenomenology, of the happening and performance, Presence became an aesthetic and ethical cri de coeur among the generation of artists and critics who emerged in the 1960s, suggesting an experience of actualness and authenticity that would contravene the depredations of an increasingly mediated, "one-dimensional" society.[12] An antidote to McLuhanism, to popular culture's virtual pleasures and blind consumerism, the aesthetics of Presence imposed rigorous, even puritanical demands: attendance at a particular site or performance; an extended, often excruciating duration.[13]

Thus the notion of site specificity allied a New Left critique of the "System" with a phenomenology of Presence, a spectatorship that unfolded in "real time and space." Here we see the origins of site specificity in the aesthetics of minimalism. Buren's canvas installations, the wall displacements of Asher and Lawrence Weiner, and Bochner's *Measurements* built upon the phenomenological inquiries of artists like Robert Morris and Dan Flavin, who exposed the viewing conditions of the "white cube" through a solicitation of Presence. As Crimp observed, "Minimal sculpture launched an attack on the prestige of the artist and artwork, granting that prestige instead to the situated spectator, whose self-conscious perception of the Minimal object in relation to the site of its installation produced the work's meaning."[14] This displacement from work to frame, from the portable modernist sculpture to an environmental practice located in the literal space of the viewer, Michael Fried characterized as the distinction between "art" and "theater."[15] According to Fried, this revelation of the viewer's presence within the literal site of the gallery blurred the distinction between an ideal aesthetic space and real space, between art and not-art. Yet minimalism and the site-specific practices that followed in its wake took the literal site as the very locus, or precondition, of advanced work.

Site specificity had a more implicit, and less recognized, source: the modernist impulse of reflexivity. Modernist reflexivity was a reflection on medium, a task Clement Greenberg compared to Kant's call for Reason to reflect on the conditions of its immanence.[16] Minimalism displaced the object of reflection another degree—from the work's medium to its ambient space, from its optical and tactile qualities as painting

and sculpture to the perceptual conditions of its display. Institutional critique caused a further displacement, from the exposure of the "white cube" as phenomenological space to a critical exposure of the art institution. In the work of Asher or Buren, the phenomenological site of Morris and Flavin was revealed as a discursive place grounded in socioeconomic relations. Yet, for all its radicality, its materialist commitment, this work still operated within a Kantian cognitive model of reflexivity: it still confined its analysis to the "frame." The criticality of such work was perspicuous only within the physical confines of, or in close proximity to, the gallery site.[17]

The functional work explores an "expanded" site: the "art world," in this activity, has become a site within a network of sites, an institution among institutions. To be sure, previous institutional critique demonstrated the financial and ideological ties of the gallery to greater economic and political structures. The System Aesthetics of Haacke posited a vectored and constitutive relationship between the museum and its corporate patrons and trustees, while Asher's well-known interventions in the *Museum as Site: 16 Projects* show at the Los Angeles County Museum (1981) and in the *Seventy-fourth American Exhibition* at the Art Institute of Chicago (1982) revealed the nationalist agendas of these institutions. But the final focus of this work was the art system as such. Today, much practice explores an expanded site, enlarging its scope of inquiry into contingent spheres of interest, contingent locations.[18] This expanded institutional critique is as much at home in natural history and anthropological collections, in zoos, parks, housing projects, and public bathrooms, as in the art gallery or museum; it may engage several sites, institutions, and collaborators at once. The ostensible subject of *Platzwechsel,* an exhibition organized by the Zurich Kunsthalle in 1995, was the Platzspitz Park, a green space located in the city's center. The show itself occurred at a number of locations: the Swiss National Museum, which borders the park (both the turrets on the upper floor and the loggia below); the Kunsthalle; and the apartment of a local dealer. Devoid of a unique place, *Platzwechsel* led the viewer on a "tour" from one landmark to the next. Moreover, the collaborative nature of *Platzwechsel,* which included work by Dion, Biemann, Müller, and Burr, resulted in a project that reflected four distinct points of view. The "work" was thus not a single entity, the installation of an individual artist in a given place. It was, on the contrary, a *function* occurring between these locations and points of view, a series of expositions of information and place. As the visitor toured the "show" in its different venues, gleaning information from project to project, he or she accumulated a broadening knowledge of the Platzspitz's past. And in the course of this viewing the history of Zurich itself began to unfold.

For some time now, artists, inspired by feminist, postcolonial, and psychoanalytic writings, by the social philosophy of Michel Foucault and cultural studies, have analyzed a spectrum of public institutions and places. However, the exploration of an "expanded" site may produce differing results: projects reflect the specific interests, educations, and formal decisions of the producer. While some artists who work in this vein do so from a functional understanding of site, still others reveal a literal site

orientation. Fred Wilson's well-known installation *Mining the Museum* at the Maryland Historical Society in Baltimore (1992–93) was a striking commentary on this city's racist past. In preparing the show, Wilson used only the artifacts and galleries of the particular institution. Praised in the popular press, *Mining the Museum* was attacked by critics who claimed the show reproduced the conventions of ethnographic analysis (the outside researcher, invited by local authorities, briefly visits the place, collects the data, presents the results, then moves on). They claimed that Wilson failed to address his own position as a "critical artist," or as an African American invited to "represent" the African American community of Baltimore.[19] In recent years, a similar critique has developed in European cities in response to the current wave of site critique. Only a local artist, an artist whose identity purportedly reflects the constituency being represented, these critics argue, should be invited to produce such work.[20] Now a functional practice, insofar as it traces the artist's movements through and around the institution, often reflecting on the character of the commission itself, inscribes his or her subjectivity within the work. In this meeting of producer and site, fixed identities blur; the insistence of a tautological correspondence of the subjectivities of the artist and community is questioned; the premise of a stable authorial self is troubled. Indeed, in the most thoughtful work, the artist-traveler or "nomad" is a thoroughly historicized subject.[21] Fraser and Müller's project for the Austrian Pavilion at the 1993 Venice Biennale considered the nationalist protocols of the international art fair, which traces its origins to nineteenth-century trade shows.[22] In the ad campaign announcing their participation, the artists posed in traditional Austrian costume in a Viennese café, counterfeiting and ironizing the Biennale's premise of national cultural representation (neither Müller nor Fraser is Austrian). Müller, in his own project, further estranged the notion of Austrianness. Traveling across Austria's borders to each of its neighboring countries without the proper visas, he enacted a series of illegal immigrations, marking these crossings with postcards mailed to his Vienna dealer from these frontier stations. Simulating the illegal immigrant's trials, Müller's gesture thematized the blurring of national identity at this historical moment of internationalism and late capitalist organization, when nationalist ideologies have returned with a vengeance.

The mobile site suggests a distinct genealogy: Happenings, situationism, Richard Long's walks, On Kawara's postcards, Tadashi Kawamata's temporary shanty towns and scaffoldings, and André Cadere's *Barres de Bois Rond,* which the artist installed temporarily in galleries and other locations throughout Paris.[23] More recently, ACT UP examined the various authorities connected with the AIDS epidemic as a sequence of site-specific critiques. Traveling to the Centers for Disease Control, the National Institutes of Health, Wall Street, and other sites, AIDS activists developed a critical practice that traversed a spectrum of medical, political, religious, and financial institutions. For ACT UP, "place" had a symbolic, as well as literal, meaning: one journeyed to each institution not simply to protest its operations, but to expose these to the media's attention. As much as any recent practice, AIDS activism demonstrated

Figure 2. Christian Philipp Müller, *Illegal Border Crossing between Austria and Principality of Liechtenstein*, 1993. Courtesy of the artist and American Fine Arts, Co., New York. Photograph by Petra Wunderlich.

the postmodernist premise, associated with, for example, the writings of Foucault and the art of Kruger and Holzer, that information is material.[24] As Simon Watney, Cindy Patton, Paula Treichler, and others have argued, the physical facts of AIDS are inextricable from their representation.[25] And one of the effects of this Foucauldian assumption was that place could not be purely experienced (like the literal site of minimalism or Richard Serra), but was itself a social and discursive entity.[26]

The work of Robert Smithson bears particular mention here. In the allegorical

Figure 3. Robert Smithson, *Study for Floating Island to Travel around Manhattan Island*, 1970. Copyright estate of Robert Smithson. Licensed by VAGA, New York; used by permission of VAGA,Inc.

practice of Smithson described by Owens, the work exists in the overlap of textual account, photographic and filmic recording, guided tours by the artist, and the literal site. Place, for Smithson, is a vectored relation: the physical site is a destination to be seen or left behind, a "tour" recalled through snapshots and travelogues. It is only temporarily experienced (the Yucatan quicksand does not allow for dillydallying), if it is seen at all (*Spiral Jetty* sank soon after its completion). Site as a unique, demarcated place available to perceptual experience alone—the phenomenological site of Serra or the critical site of institutional critique—becomes a network of sites referring to an *elsewhere*. In the Smithson nonsite of the mid-1960s, the maps and rock containers point to the quarries from which the materials have been drawn. Inversely, the site refers to the gallery or magazine context of the nonsite. *Spiral Jetty*, completed in 1970, fractured the dialectical model of the earlier nonsites into a multipartite sequence of representations and literal sites. "Like the non-site, the *Jetty* is not a discrete work, but one link in a chain of signifiers which summon and refer to one another in a dizzy spiral," Owens writes. "For where else does *Spiral Jetty* exist except in the film which Smithson made, the narrative he published, the photographs which accompany that narrative, and the various maps, diagrams, drawings, etc., he made about it?"[27]

At *Platzwechsel*, the installations and texts set up a semantic chain that traversed physical borders; the Kunsthalle itself was transformed into an elaborate nonsite, a fabric of allusions. A concrete plinth built by Müller recalled a monument to the

Swiss Romantic poet Salomon Gessner located in the park; a wooden "surveillance booth" above referred to the turrets of the Swiss National Museum (once used by the police to monitor the park's notorious drug scene); the medieval Hardturm, Zurich's oldest tower, on which their design was based (just down the street, Hardturmstrasse, from the Kunsthalle itself); an observation station across the river from the Platzspitz, also used to survey the drug trade; and an art dealer's apartment in which the turrets' windows, removed from the tower, were placed. The lines' location of private and public life, of observer and observed, of historical and present-day experience was vectored and intertwined.

Burr's displacement of flora and earth from the Platzspitz to a container in the Kunsthalle recalled the park as it existed in the 1970s—the seemingly placid interlude before the onslaught of the drug culture during the 1980s, a period when the Platzspitz was known principally as a site of gay male assignation. The oral accounts of the park's visitors of those years, assembled by Burr in the Kunsthalle, reinscribed the park in personal and discursive history. For these individuals the Platzspitz was less a physical place than an object of memory, a symbol of a "quieter" time before liberation and AIDS. For gay men in their twenties, whose accounts were also recorded, it had none of these associations, however: they could only remember the park as a drug market.

The mobile site is an in-between site, a nonplace, a ruin. Whereas the critical monument of Serra wishes to dominate a civic plaza, Smithson's "monument" is entropic, a run-down factory, a polluted marsh, a wasteland stretching between city and


Figure 4. Tom Burr, *Circa 1977*, 1995. Landscape displacement from the Platzspitz, Zurich, to the Kunsthalle Zürich. Plywood container with soil, plants, trees, and rocks, 4 X 4 meters. Courtesy of the artist and American Fine Arts, Co., New York.

country, a "slurb." The Platzspitz park is such a "monument." Once at the edge of the baroque city, it is now Zurich's center. Yet it is an empty center, a not-quite-usable place between industrial, civic, and natural boundaries (the National Museum, the train station, the Limmat and Sihl Rivers, the warehouses and factories beyond). It has remained willfully unassimilated to official life: "The Platzspitz became a place of refuge for various fringe groups in the 20th century," we read in a recent account. "The revival attempts of the most varied kinds [including the restoration of 1991] were able to do little to change this" because of its "isolated location."[28] It is the kind of space that the philosophers Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari have described as nomadic, a shifting or deterritorialized site at odds with sedentary, striated space, the organized ambience of the polis; a space inhabited by nomadic peoples or "fringe groups." The nomad "goes from one point to another . . . ," Deleuze and Guattari write. "Every point is a relay and exists only as a relay. A path is only between two points, but the in-between has taken on all the consistency and enjoys both an autonomy and a direction of its own."[29] For all its renovations—the official attempts to evacuate unwanted groups—the park resists territorialization. During the period of its most recent restoration, in the early 1990s, the Platzspitz was closed. Yet the drug culture merely changed its location (hence the exhibition title, *Platzwechsel*), penetrating to less visible zones. The function of the Platzspitz as *nomos* has continued *after* the abandonment of the literal site. In other words, the *nomos* remains at the heart of the polis, a fact the polis politely ignores. "What counts for me is that what you don't see is OK," as one official put it.[30]

Much current work explores a mobile notion of site and a nomadic subjectivity. The travel snapshots of Martha Rosler; the vectored gallery critiques of Stephen Prina; Gabriel Orozco's floating balls, hammocks, and yellow scooters; Rikrit Tiravanija's tents and dinners (which, performed from one gallery to the next, mark the artist's peregrinations); and the practices of Burr, Fraser, Müller, Dion, and Green have surfaced at a time of unprecedented globalization and multinational mergers, of instantaneous satellite transmission and the Internet, when terms like *synergy, linkage,* and *flow* are the new corporate mantras. The shabby traveling salesman of yesteryear has devolved into an international flaneur who moves through VIP lounges and airport hotels in a perpetual motion.[31] Concurrently, a relative democratization of travel and the dissolution of formerly closed borders have fostered a more universal itinerancy. Thus the displacement from the literal site of the 1960s, grounded in the verities of phenomenological experience, to a mobile, mediated placement follows the global reach of capitalism itself, the triumph of the free market predicted by Ernest Mandel and Fredric Jameson in now classic studies. At the turn of the century, the late capitalist culture inaugurated in the 1960s—the culture that site specificity sought to resist—has achieved a new apogee.[32]

The most convincing site-related work not only represents, or enacts, this mobility, but also reflects on these new parameters. *Secret,* a work by Renée Green produced for two different shows, *Project Unité,* curated by Yves Aupetitallot at Firminy, France,

p. 232). Its sphere likewise has its internal differentiation. The lowest step is that of the painted set which is purely a sign. A mock-up is richer by having real depth, and is thus one step closer to the genuine object which it stands for. On the same level with mock-ups are dummies standing for human beings as part of the set. Finally, many real objects may be part of the set, such as chairs, vases, etc. They are on the same level with human beings as part of the set.

The set shares many similar properties with the *costume*. The purpose of the latter is likewise to characterize people and milieus. It differs from the set mainly by the fact that the set characteriezs mainly the setting, whereas the costume characterizes mainly the person. The costume is on the same level with the mock-ups and real objects that are associated with the set.

The fact that the parts of the set do not act overtly may give rise to the impression that the set is outside of the action and has no effect on its course. In that case, it could be said to constitute a self-contained and clearly delimited sphere. This would, however, be a completely erroneous impression. It is enough to point out, for instance, how entirely differently a dispute between two characters will take its course when the set represents an inn, or a royal palace. Even if the overt action of the set is on the zero level, it does have its part in determining the course of the action. That is also why it cannot be delimited as a closed sphere, nor can the point be stated at which objects begin to take part in the action overtly and become *props*. It often seems that a given object in one situation is part of the set or costume, and in the next becomes a prop. In reality, however, its function is determined by the antinomy of two opposing forces contained within it: the dynamic forces of action and the static forces of characterization. Their relationship is not stable; in certain situations one predominates, in others the other, sometimes they are in balance. Let us, for instance, take the *dagger* in the following situations:

1. Figure A with a dagger. The dagger is here part of the costume and shows the wearer's noble or military status. The characterizing force of the dagger here clearly outweighs its action force which is pushed completely into the background.

2. Figure B insults figure A, he draws his dagger and stabs B to death. Here, in the context of a certain action, the action force of the dagger suddenly comes completely to the fore, it becomes a prop and takes part in the action as a tool.

3. Figure A flees holding a bloody dagger. The dagger here is a sign of murder, but at the same time is closely connected with the flight, that is, with the action. Both forces of the object are in balance.

The prop is usually designated the passive tool of the actor's action. This does not, however, do full justice to its nature. The prop is not always passive. It has a force (which we called the action force) that attracts a certain action to it. As soon as a certain prop appears on the stage, this force which it has provokes in us the expectation of a certain action. It is so closely linked to this action that its use for another purpose is perceived as a scenic metonymy. This link is shown even clearer in the case of the so-called *imaginary props*. What is an imaginary prop? The actor performs without props an action for which a certain prop is usually required; the spectator feels its presence although in reality it is not present. Cf. for instance this scene from Meyerhold's production of Ostrovskii's *The Forest*:

> ". . . the comic gives a virtuoso's pantomime. He sits down on the step, holding a rod, and pretends to be casting into the scenes to the left; there is of course no hook on the rod . . . the comic 'catches a fish', takes it off the hook—although he has nothing in his hand, makes a grab for it, finally puts it away." (V. Tille, *Moskva v listopadu* [Moscow in November], 1929, p. 40).

An analog of this procedure can also be found in everyday life: gestures imitating the use of a certain object, in order to designate it. Such gestures are for instance used by foreigners, when, for instance, they ask for a drink by imitating drinking movements. In the theater, the purpose is different, of course.

The link between prop and action is demonstrated in an opposite way *when no subject is present in the play,* that is, when no actor is on stage. Even then, the action does not stop. The action force of the object comes to the fore in all its power. The objects on the stage, including perhaps also their mechanical movements such as that of the pendulum of a clock, exploit our consciousness of the uninterrupted course of events and create in us the feeling of action. Without any intervention of the actor, the props shape the action. They are no longer the tools of the actor, we perceive them as spontaneous subjects equivalent to the figure of the actor. For this process to occur, one condition must be met: the prop must not be the mere outline of an object to which it is linked by a factual relationship, because only if it preserves its reality can it radiate its action force and suggest action to the spectator. If J. Honzl claims that "tables may become beings whom we hate more passionately than our enemies" (*Sláva a bída divadel* [The Glory and Misery of the Theater], Prague, 1937, p. 218), this principle is certainly connected to his statement (p. 56) that:

> "Stockmann's torn coat belongs to the things that were the forte of the realist theater and the naturalist stage. For them alone, the Khu-

dozhestvennyĭ Group [Moscow Art Theater] will be dear to us, because they built real doors that squeaked, they put up real furniture and a genuine billiard table with two white balls and one black, and Andrey Sergeyich Prozorov was pushing a real baby buggy on the stage. The genuine things, the table, the coat, the tear, the remote sounds of the marching band, are the only heritage that we can take over after them."

Action in the absence of the subject is, however, not the only mode of *personification*. And what really is personification? It is "a force, indefinite but powerful, which reinforces the spontaneity of an event by emphasizing the participation of the acting subject. Events in general can, in terms of spontaneity, be divided into three categories: at the lowest level are the mechanical events in nature lacking in any kind of spontaneity, their course being determined by a previously given regularity without exceptions; one step higher are such actions of live beings which, though not subject to a law without exceptions, are directed by habit and thus predictable in their course (for instance, our daily actions in getting up, eating, going to sleep, and many of our professional actions); the third group finally includes action in the proper sense of the word, based on the unlimited initiative of the subject and therefore unpredictable, different in each case. The purpose of personification is to raise the first two levels of action to the third. It does not necessarily mean that things have to be 'made into persons' in the real sense of the word, as is the case for instance in the fable: that is merely a special case of personification (for instance, in M. Maeterlinck's *L'Oiseau bleu,* added by the author). It is enough if things which in reality are passive subjects of action appear as active subjects, even though they may retain their usual shape" (J. Mukařovský, *Sémantický rozbor básnického díla* [Semantic Analysis of Works of Poetry], Sl.Sl. 4.7 [1938]).

Such a personification occurs, for instance, in Reinhardt's production of Strindberg's *The Pelican:*

> Scene after the burial of the husband, on stage his wife who has caused his death. V. Tille describes the scene as follows: "It was as if the shadow of the dead man were pacing the house, the woman is constantly afraid of being alone, the door opened by the wind frightens her. . . The only room used in all three acts, overfilled with dark furniture, is plunged in darkness. Throughout all three acts, with small interruptions, the wind is whistling and whining behind the stage, shaking the open window and the white curtains, growing into a strong draft whenever the door opens and blowing the papers from the desk on which the leaves in the books and the flame of the lamp are moving. This naturalistic virtuosity at first makes a terrifying impression, especially when the open door is shaking in the void whenever the script requires it" (*Divadelní vzpomínky* [Memories of the Theater], pp. 170 ff.)

Another, less evident, personification is in the Japanese drama *Terakoya* or *The Village School,* by Takeda Izumo (Czech transl. *Dvě japonská dramata* [Two Japanese Dramas]):

> Situation: The teacher Genzo hides in his house the small son of the expelled chancellor. The lady Chiyo is bringing her child to school, a boy who is the exact likeness of the chancellor's son. The teacher goes behind stage and kills the lady Chiyo's son. The vassals exit. Suddenly Chiyo returns.
>
> Chiyo (visibly excited): Oh, it's you, Mr. Takebe Genzo, esteemed teacher. Today, I brought in my little boy. Where is he? He hasn't given you trouble by any chance?
>
> Genzo: Oh no—he's back there . . . in the back room . . . he's playing with the others. Do you want to see him. . . Perhaps you want to take him home?
>
> Chiyo: Yes, bring him in please. . . I want to take him home. . .
>
> Genzo (stands up): He'll be right in. Come in please. . . (Chiyo turns to the back door; Genzo pulls his sword behind her back and gets set for a terrible blow, but Chiyo as if warned by something turns around and avoids the blow. Quickly jumping between the desks she seizes her son's box and uses it to ward off Genzo's new blow)
>
> Chiyo: Stop! Stop!
>
> Genzo (taking another swing): Devilish thing! (The blow shatters the box, scattering a little white garment, pieces of paper with prayers written on them, a small burial flag, and some other small things used in burials)
>
> Genzo (horrified): In the devil's name, what is this? (Lowers his hand holding the sword)
>
> The situation ends by a spontaneous intervention of the props saving the lady Chiyo's life.

THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN MAN AND OBJECT. We have followed the different degrees of participation in the action by the various components, degrees different by the extent of activeness. It became clear that the transition between them is quite gradual, so that they can not be considered sealed-off spheres. The function of each component in the individual situation (and in the drama as a whole) is the resultant of the constant tension between activity and passivity in terms of the action, which manifests itself in a constant flow back and forth between the individual components, people and things. It is therefore impossible to draw a line between subject and object, since each component is potentially either. We have seen various examples of how thing and man can change places, how a man can become a thing and a thing a living being. We can thus not speak of two mutually delimited spheres; the relation of man to object in the theater can be characterized as a *dialectic antinomy*. We have seen in the above examples that the dialectic antinomy between man and thing occurs

in the most varied structures and is thus not the exclusive property of the modern theater. In some structures, of course, it is emphasized, and in others suppressed and minimized.

The view that man in the theater is exclusively the active subject and things are passive objects or tools of the action arose, as has already been mentioned, at a time when the theorists had in mind only the realist theater. But not even in the realist theater was the fluctuation between man and object removed completely, it was only suppressed to such an extent that the error which we have already spoken of could occur. The realist theater attempted (although it never really succeeded) to be a reflection of reality not only in its individual components, but also in their integration. And in daily life we are of course used to differentiate very exactly between man and thing as far as their spontaneous activity goes, but again only in terms of our present-day epistemological horizon as determined by civilized life. In other horizons, for instance in the mythical world views of primitives or children, personification and the fluctuation between man and things play a very important part indeed. Although civilization is progress as compared to the primitive way of life, it can not be denied that its forms so far have by the most varied conventions broken up the direct relationship between man and his environment. On the example of action in the absence of the subject we have seen how precisely these conventions can be used to link together unconventionally various aspects of reality. We are perhaps not exaggerating if we claim that this is one of the most important social objectives of the theater. This is precisely where the theater can show new ways of perceiving and understanding the world.

In *Power Up* specific context is constructed. The intended effect is that upon entering the exhibition the viewer crosses a threshold into a dynamic visual and contextual environment. Ephemeral materials relating to how, when, and why the artworks were produced are an important part of *Power Up*. Context implies symbiotic processes between images and ideas. It challenges any clear-cut notion of separation between objects, exhibitions, and the outside world. Context is the active ground on which circumstances, features, and relations—between people, events, ideas, activities, and objects—are not fixed but are constantly in dialogue.

The primary juxtaposition in *Power Up* is of these two artists who are not readily united either historically or formally. In the exhibition design, the artworks are newly situated in actual and potential relations. Such juxtapositions and spatial arrangements render the works interactive in multiple combinations. Works commingle in circumstances that open up new and unprecedented relations and meanings.

Against Anticipatory Obedience

(JANUARY 2025)

The statement that follows, prepared by a joint subcommittee of the Association's Committee on College and University Governance and Committee A on Academic Freedom and Tenure, was approved for publication by the parent committees in December 2024 and adopted by the Council in January 2025.

As Donald Trump assumes the presidency for a second time, the outlook for higher education is dire. The new administration's agenda for higher education has been thoroughly prepared by a series of statewide legal assaults on public colleges and universities in North Carolina, Florida, Texas, and elsewhere, as well as by the high-profile congressional witch hunt that within the past year brought down the presidents of three Ivy League institutions.[1]

How should we respond? The University of Chicago's 1967 Kalven Report, often cited as the source of calls for "institutional neutrality," declares, "From time to time instances will arise in which the society, or segments of it, threaten the very mission of the university and its values of free inquiry. In such a crisis, it becomes the obligation of the university as an institution to oppose such measures and actively to defend its interests and its values."[2] This is undoubtedly such a time.

It will take courage and stamina to resist efforts, already well underway, to undermine tenure and academic freedom protections, eviscerate shared governance, diminish the faculty's control over the curriculum, and redefine higher education to benefit private interests over the public good.[3] There is good reason to fear that many college and university leaders—trustees, chancellors, presidents, provosts, deans, and more than a few faculty members—will seek to accommodate, if not capitulate to, these unwarranted incursions into higher education, especially when they come in the form of new laws. Some may even welcome another Trump administration as offering an opportunity to implement "reforms" they have long sought. In the 1950s, when the second Red Scare led to a purge of faculty members for their (sometimes only former) political affiliations, few educational leaders spoke up against it; fewer still followed words with actions. And faculty members were far too frequently complicit in attacks on their colleagues, especially those unprotected by tenure. Even the AAUP dragged its feet.

One might sympathize with administrators who are pressured by politicians and, in some cases, monied donors. The power of the purse is strong. It is, perhaps, too much to ask that governing boards and administrations, much less faculty members, defy the edicts of those who fund their institutions, especially when attacks on higher education may occur under the cover of law. But resistance is necessary, and it can take many forms.

Unfortunately, troubling recent events suggest that some administrations are not only acquiescing

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1. For more on state-level attacks on higher education, see "Report of a Special Committee: Governance, Academic Freedom, and Institutional Racism in the University of North Carolina System," *Academe* 108, no. 3 (Summer 2022): 33–69, and "Report of a Special Committee: Political Interference and Academic Freedom in Florida's Public Higher Education System," *Academe* 110, no. 3 (Summer 2024): 15–46.

2. "Kalven Committee: Report on the University's Role in Political and Social Action," *The University of Chicago Record* 1, no. 1 (November 3, 1967): 3, https://campub.lib.uchicago.edu/view/?docId =mvol-0446-0001-0001.

3. For discussion of these efforts, see Brendan Cantwell, "A Second Trump Term Could Devastate Higher Ed," *The Chronicle of Higher Education*, October 31, 2024, https://www.chronicle.com/article /a-second-trump-term-could-devastate-higher-ed.

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Against Anticipatory Obedience

to attacks on fundamental principles but engaging in what scholars of authoritarianism call *anticipatory obedience*—that is, they are acting to comply in advance of any pressure to do so.[4] One case in point is the recent review of all course content for "antisemitism or anti-Israel bias" in the Florida state university system, initiated by its chancellor at the urging of a member of the state house of representatives. Courses flagged by the review for further scrutiny included Percussion Ensemble, Global Hip Hop, General Parasitology, and Painting Workshop.[5]

Similarly, the University of North Texas administration recently censored the content of more than two hundred academic courses, including by mandating the removal of words such as *race*, *gender*, *class*, and *equity* from undergraduate and graduate course titles and descriptions.[6] These actions were allegedly taken in response to state legislation banning certain diversity, equity, and inclusion programs and practices, even though the legislation specifically exempted academic course content.

While university administrators and faculty members may be compelled to comply with legislation and court orders, even where these run counter to professional and constitutional principles, they remain free to register their disagreement. And under no circumstances should an institution go further than the law demands. Yet, the examples above depict an eagerness to obey on the part of administrative officers, portending a bleak future for higher education.

The AAUP's 1956 special investigative report on the anticommunist scare concluded,

> We cannot censure the justified public interest in colleges and universities, or be unmindful of the extremely difficult task confronting academic administrations that seek to preserve educational

and research opportunities in order to serve the general welfare in spite of the suspicions of a public which, at times, has been confused by complicated issues or led astray by demagogic appeals. The temptation to yield a little in order to preserve a great deal is strong. . . . Yet to yield a little is, in such matters, to run the risk of sacrificing all. . . .

> We cannot accept an educational system that is subject to the irresponsible push and pull of contemporary controversies; and we deem it to be the duty of all elements in the academic community—faculty, trustees, officials, and, as far as possible, students—to stand their ground firmly even while they seek, with patient understanding, to enlarge and deepen popular comprehension of the nature of academic institutions and of society's dependence upon unimpaired intellectual freedom.[7]

The Trump administration and many Republican-led state governments appear poised to accelerate attacks on academic freedom, shared governance, and higher education as a public good. They will attack the curricular authority of the faculty on a number of fronts, including professors' ability to undertake "teaching, research, and service that respond to the needs of a diverse global public."[8] It is the higher education community's responsibility not to surrender to such attacks—and not to surrender in anticipation of them. Instead, we must vigorously and loudly oppose them.

It will be vital, then, that we ensure our ability to resist the onslaught. We encourage AAUP chapters and conferences, unions, and faculty senates across the nation to take the following actions:

1. Review handbooks and contracts to strengthen and reinforce faculty rights in the areas of curricular reform and course approval; academic program discontinuance; and faculty appointments, reappointments, promotions, and dismissals.
2. Review and reform policies to strengthen faculty oversight in areas currently being used to exercise excessive and undue discipline against faculty,

4. Historian Timothy Snyder developed the concept of anticipatory obedience in *On Tyranny: Twenty Lessons from the Twentieth Century* (Crown, 2017).

5. Ryan Quinn, "Lawmaker Claims Credit for Antisemitism Review at Florida Universities," *Inside Higher Ed*, August 9, 2024, https://www.insidehighered.com/news/faculty-issues/academic-freedom/2024/08/09/lawmaker-claims-credit-antisemitism-review-florida; Emma Pettit, "Do These Courses Contain Antisemitic Content?," *The Chronicle of Higher Education*, October 11, 2024, https://www.chronicle.com/article/do-these-courses-contain-antisemitic-content.

6. Texas AAUP-AFT, "University of North Texas Censors Course Content," *Academe Blog*, November 19, 2024, https://academeblog.org/2024/11/19/university-of-north-texas-censors-course-content.

7. "Academic Freedom and Tenure in the Quest for National Security," *AAUP Bulletin* 42, no. 1 (Spring 1956): 97.

8. "Diversity, Equity, and Inclusion Criteria for Faculty Evaluation," AAUP, October 2024, https://www.aaup.org/report/diversity-equity-and-inclusion-criteria-faculty-evaluation.

staff, and students. These include Title IX and Title VI policies and procedures, acceptable-use policies regarding institutional resources, events and outside speakers policies, and campus free speech and protest policies, among others.

3. Organize locally, regionally, and nationally. The erosion of faculty rights goes hand in hand with attacks on tenure, faculty unions, and academic governance.

4. Strengthen local capacity to protect tenure and academic freedom by establishing or staffing a Committee A on Academic Freedom and Tenure in every chapter and state conference.

5. Strengthen local capacity to protect faculty governance by promoting AAUP resources on governance, including the *Statement on Government of Colleges and Universities*, within chapters, to faculty senates, and across institutions. Ensure the inclusion of protections for faculty members' intramural speech concerning the governance of their institutions.

Now is not the time to be complacent. Now is the time to act. ∎

XVIII

I see white solar emissions radiations of thought blazing with fire

The sun has lived half its life STOP it stands at the center of the Scales

5 billion years on each side 5 billion Arabs hungered
Big blue tattoo on the galaxy's face YES ! YES ! we are hungry
When Guatemala breaks down Indians become watermelon seeds

the sun glides the sun flies the sun swims the sun slides the sun runs away

an intermediary yellow sun   the yellow sun of menopause

This pupil in the big eye is the sun   stares at us intensely
We are Xrayed by the sun and the lies we tell are tumors
When Guatemala breaks under the teeth of the Earth they start laughing in Washington

LAUGHTER the sun is laughing LAUGHTER the sun is laughing LAUGHTER the sun is laughing

5 billion solar years   are grass snakes hiding in the texture of TIME

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