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INVESTIGATION INTO THE SOURCE OF THE 7 OCTOBER 1991 BLAST AT THE PRESIDENTIAL PALACE IN ZAGREB, BASED ON PUBLISHED REPORTS

Analysis of published news reports, including television news footage, from before and after the 7 October 1991 blast at the presidential palace in Zagreb has led us to these conclusions, for now:

the blast, along with other damage to the palace, was caused not by aircraft, presumably from the Yugoslav Air Force

rather, the blast and other damage were caused by a ground attack on the palace, almost certainly from the extreme right

the Tadjman regime has blamed the Yugoslav Air Force in order to rally public support around him.

given projections of a future "Donau Monarchy" incorporating Croatia and Slovenia together with Austria and Hungary, as published in Bunte, and given the editorial response to the blast, comparing it to the Archduke Franz Joseph assassination of 1914, as published in Die Welt, we conclude that there is substantial support in Germany for a solution to the right of that--viz., independence--championed by Tadjman.

We therefore conclude that the situation in Yugoslavia is far more dangerous than a mere civil war, and that on 7 October 1991--the official date of EC-sanctioned Croatian independence--a coup was attempted by the far right, supporting restoration of a Habsburg-style regime, at the Presidential palace.

We have reviewed news reports from before and shortly after the bomb blast, notably in Germany, the US-UK, and both Zagreb and Belgrade. Documents, including video footage, continues to come in for review. At this time, we draw our conclusions from these news-released items.

1. Nothing in the visual evidence of a bomb blast indicates that it was caused by a high-speed incoming rocket, let alone four rockets as sometimes reported. Rather, it appears to have taken place from inside the palace grounds.

2. When a number of officials, including plainclothed security agents, left the entrance to the palace grounds, they did so with extreme caution and attention to possible attack from around them. They even hurried up, as if to disperse quickly. This does not evidence concern for an air attack so much as for a ground attack. This conforms with the very high number of heavily armed guards escorting news reporters and Mr. Tadjman throughout the palace.

3. A press conference was held by Yugoslav army officials two days later in which they explained, with video footage, that the recorded visual evidence of a bomb blast does not conform with what aircraft would do. Croatian TV news footage was used for proof. Commentary was led by an explosives expert and an air force officer.

4. At the press conference, it was noted that the names of the people on the commission appointed by President Markovic to investigate the palace blast were completely unknown.

5. As far as we know, no air attack was ever made at any other time on Zagreb, and the progress of battlefield activity indicates not an intention to either attack or endanger Zagreb but rather to cut off vital rail and road links from Zagreb to territories which are contestably not belonging to Croatia. Fighting at Vukovar and Karlovec are part of attempts to dismember Croatia, letting Zagreb and the heart remain intact.

6. Smoke marks inside the palace courtyard suggest a blast inside, confined to one or two corners, probably accomplished by dynamite, rather than a high-temperature blast from a rocket.

7. The walls of the palace courtyard are pocketed with scattered small holes, which appear to result from either gunfire or dynamite (grenade) blasts.

8. The repeated footage of the waiting BMW limousine leaves a residue of suspicion that some attempt was made on the courtyard at about the time the Croatian officials would have been driven through it. The damage, of course, is not that caused by an air-to-surface rocket.

9. News footage released by Croatian TV emphasizes an emotional patriotic reference to a painting of (apparently) Croatian nobility. This would serve to help build support for Tudjman.

10. The day before the bomb blast, as news reports say, an automobile with four right-wing Croatian political figures was shot up, leaving three dead.

Altogether, it seems more likely to us that the events of 7 October 1991 in Zagreb were part of an internal Croatian power struggle, chiefly between the extreme right and more moderate leadership of Mr. Tudjman, rather than the struggle over Croatian territory--all far from Zagreb--between Croatian and Yugoslav forces.

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